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RESTITUTION UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS: WHAT
CONSTITUTES AN UNJUST RETENTION*

Lindsey R. Jeanblanct
1. Introduction

I

N order to recover in restitution the plaintiff must establish, first,
that a legal benefit was conferred upon the defendant and, second,
that the retention of that benefit was unjust. 1 The problem of determining what constitutes a legal benefit in the cases of restitution
under the statute of frauds is discussed in another article.2 The purpose
of this article is to examine what does or does not constitute an unjust
retention in such cases, including some of the grounds on which the
defendant may successfully contend that his retention of a benefit is
not unjust.
2. Determination of Unjust Retention-In General

As will be pointed out in the subsequent discussion, unjustness has
a less definite meaning than ''benefit." But what are the various factors
which influence its determination? How do they operate? Is it necessary to examine only the conduct of the defendant in order to ascertain
what constitutes an unjust retention? Or is it also necessary to investigate other factors including the conduct of the plaintiff?
Let us suppose that the defendant received one hundred dollars
from the plaintiff. The conduct of the defendant in accepting and
retaining the one hundred dollars would appear to be the same regardless of whether the money was received from an officious intermeddler,
or from a plaintiff as partial performance of an oral agreement that did
not comply with the requirements of the statute of frauds. Yet the
unjustness of the retention would be materially different if considered
in the light of the plaintiff's conduct in each of these situations. In this
connection Professor Woodward said:
" This article is one of a series submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law, in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University.
t Associate Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law, St. Louis, Missouri.-Ed.
1 RBsnnm:oN RBsTATEMENT §1 (1937).
2 See my article entitled, ''Restitution under the Statute of Frauds: What Constitutes
a Legal Benefit," to be published subsequently.
I
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"The retention of a benefit conferred in misreliance upon a
right or duty is generally inequitable. Certain circumstances,
however, have been recognized by the courts as justifying a refusal
to make restitution. . . . Restitution should not be enforced in
favor of one who, in the course of the transaction giving rise to his
claim, was guilty of serious misconduct toward the person from
whom he seeks to recover." 3
Accordingly, if the plaintiff's conduct is clearly unjust or inequitable,
restitution is denied,4 but if he rendered performance in response to
the defendant's request and promise of return performance in the unenforceable agreement, restitution, in many instances, is allowed.11 It
will be observed that when the conduct of the plaintiff is unjust or
inequitable, there is less likelihood of finding that the retention of the
benefit is unjust. And, on the other hand, when there is an absence of
unjust or inequitable conduct on the part of the plaintiff, there is a
greater likelihood of finding that the retention.of the benefit is unjust.
Thus, it would seem, that the inequitable or unjust conduct of the
plaintiff, in effect, is set off against similar conduct of the defendant,
and the result determines, for the most part, whether or not the retention of the benefit by the defendant is unjust. The Restatement of
Restitution states the principle as follows:
"Even where a person has received a benefit from another, he
is liable to pay therefor only if the circumstances of its receipt or
retention are such that, as between the two persons, it is unjust for
him to retain it." 6

In the cases involving restitution under oral agreements which do
not comply with the statute of frauds, the extent of unjust or inequitable conduct of the plaintiff, as well as of the defendant, varies considerably depending upon such factors as the following: (1) the effect of
the repudiation of the oral agreement, (2) the wilful or inadvertent
character of the plaintiff's repudiation, (3) the effect of the statute of
frauds upon the oral agreement, ( 4) the extent of performance rendered, (5) the failure to make restoration, and (6) the willingness of
the defendant to be bound by the terms of the oral agreement. These
factors will be discussed in the order listed.
s WooDWARD, QuAsx CoNTRACTS

§140 (1937).

30 (1913). See

also REsTITUTION RESTATEMENT

.
§2 (1937).
5 See my article, ''Restitution under the Statute of Frauds: What Constitutes a Legal
Benefit," to be published subsequently.
6 RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT §l, comment c (1937). Italics added.
4 REsTITUTION REsTATEMENT
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3. Determination of Unjust Retention-Effect of the Repudiation

In order to ascertain whether or not the defendant is unjustly retaining a legal benefit it is necessary to consider the inequitable character of his conduct. In the cases of restitution under the statute of
frauds the defendant, by entering into the oral agreement, not only
requested the plaintiff's performance, but also promised something in
return therefor. Thus, the defendant should have realized that the
plaintiff's performance would be rendered in expectation of pay. Further, the defendant subsequently accepted and consumed or retained
the benefit from the plaintiff's performance. If the defendant repudiated the unenforceable agreement under these circumstances, it would
seem that his conduct, though not such as to make him liable in tort,
or for breach of the agreement, should constitute an unjust retention.
The courts have so held1 unless the unjustness of the defendant's conduct is offset by inequitable or unjust condu_ct on the part of the plaintiff. 8 If the plaintiff defaulted, however, the majority of the courts have
found that the defendant's retention was not unjust; and as a consequence, restitution ~as been denied for money,9 goods,1° land,11 serv7 For a discussion of these cases see my article, ''Restitution under the Statute of
Frauds: What Constitutes a Legal Benefit," to be published subsequently.
8 The plaintiff has been denied restitution for his partial performance, for example,
so long as he remains in possession of the land under the terms of the oral agreement. Hill
v. Den, 121 Cal. 42, 53 P. 642 (1898) (services rendered under oral agreement to purchase
land); McDonald v. Beall, 52 Ga. 576 (1874) (money paid under oral agreement to
purchase land, and the plaintiff failed to prove that he was actually evicted from possession
of the land by a title superior to that of the defendant); Parham v. Kennedy, 60 Ga. App.
52, 2 S.E. (2d) 765 (1939) (plaintiff, who took possession of land under oral 5-year lease
as payment for materials furnished to the defendant, was not entitled to a materialman's
lien until he had made restoration to the defendant); Abbott v. Draper, 4 Denio (N.Y.) 51
(1847) (goods and money parted with under an oral agreement to purchase land).
9 The case of Campbell v. Fair, (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) 82 S.W. (2d) 1038 involved
three contracts for the sale of land which were within the statute of frauds because the land
was not properly described. ·The vendee sued to cancel the contracts and also to recover
$5,000 he had paid to the defendant under the contracts as a part of the purchase price.
The defendant tendered an amended contract· which correctly described the lands, and it
was held that the lower court properly entered judgment for the defendant.
For other cases wherein the defaulting plaintiff has been denied restitution for money
paid under an unenforceable agreement, see infra, note 14.
10 Galway v. Shields, 66 Mo. 313, 27 Am. Rep. 351 (1877); Lang v. Murphy, 137
Mo. App. 217, 117 S.W. 665 (1909) ($400 worth of whiskey delivered under oral agreement for the purchase of a $1,200 tract of land); Lane v. Shackford, 5 N.H. 130 (1830);
(;reen v. North Carolina Railroad Co., 77 N.C. 95 (1877) (cord wood delivered under an
oral agreement for the purchase of land); see Kneeland v. Fuller, 51 Me. 518 at 520
(1863); Allis v. Read, 45 N.Y. 142 at 146 (1871); Bennett v. Giles, (Tex. Civ. App. 1928)
12 S.W. (2d) 843 at 844-846.
11 In Lane v. Shackford, 5 N.H. 130 (1830) the plaintiff orally agreed to purchase a
tract of land from the defendant, and as payment thereon the plaintiff conveyed another
tract of land, delivered two steers, rendered services, and paid $19 in cash.to the defendant.
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ices,12 or improvements13 parted with by defaulting plaintiffs in performance of oral agreements, irrespective of the precise manner in which
Although $30 of the purchase price was still unpaid, the plaintiff sued in assumpsit for
money had and received, upon an account annexed to the writ, and for land sold and
conveyed. He also included a special count setting out the above agreement. The defendant
mortgaged the land he was to convey, but it did not appear that he had refused to perform
the oral agreement with the plaintiff. It was held that a verdict for the plaintiff should be
set aside and a new trial granted. Cf. Uden v. Patterson, 252 ill. 335, 96 N.E. 852 (1911)
wherein one of several heirs objected to the sale of land and refused to carry out an oral
agreement for its conveyance although the other parties were ready and willing, but it was
held that he was not thereby barred from maintaining a suit against the co-heirs for the
partition of the land.
It has been suggested that the paucity of cases on this point is due, in part, to the wide
latitude concerning the time allowed vendors of land in which to perfect their title, and to
the fact that land is not ordinarily conveyed until the purchase price has been paid, or security
given therefor. Patterson, "Restitution for Benefits Conferred by Party in Default under
Contract," prepared for the New York Law Revision Commission, N.Y. Legislative Doc. No.
65 (F) 17, 58-59 (1942).
12 The following cases involved the land provision of the statute of frauds: Colorado
Lumber Land & lmprov. Co. v. Dustin, 38 Colo. 398, 87 P. 1142 (1906); Mitchell v. McNab; I ill. App. 297 (1878) (grading streets in defendant's sub-division); Congdon v. Perry,
13 Gray (79 Mass.) 3 (1859); Riley v. Williams, 123 Mass. 506 (1878) (plaintiff built
street under an oral agreement whereby he was to receive blacksmith work and a tract of
land); Shaw v. Shaw, 6 Vt. 69 (1834) (oral agreement to provide support to defendant for
life in return for a tract of land); cf. Mahan v. Close, 63 Minn. 21, 65 N.W. 95 (1895)
(plaintiff moved defendant's building to land that plaintiff had orally agreed to purchase
from the defendant, and it was held that the moving of the building satisfied the statute of
frauds).
The one year provision of the statute was involved in the following cases: Swanzey v.
Moore, 22 ill. 63, 74 Am. Dec. 134 (1859) (farm labor); Kriger v. Leppel, 42 Minn. 6, 43
N.W. 484 (1889) (farm labor); Abbott v. lnskip, 29 Ohio St. 59 (1875) (oral agreement
between defendant and the plaintiff's mother that the plaintiff, a minor, should work twelve
years for defendant); Philbrook v. Belknap, 6 Vt. 383 (1834) (oral agreement fo serve as
mill wright for three years); Mack v. Bragg, 30 Vt. 571 (1858) (plaintiff, a minor, orally
agreed to work 5 years for the defend.ant); d. Clark v. Terry, 25 Conn. 395 (1856) (suit
was held to be premature because the oral agreement provided for payment only at the end
of six months). Thus the court distinguished the case of Comes v. Lamson, 16 Conn. 246
(1844) which allowed recovery.
13 In the following cases, the defaulting contractor prepared streets in the defendant's
sub-division under an oral agreement in return for which he was to receive land: Mitchell v.
McNab, I ill. App. 297-(1878); Congdon v. Perry, 13 Gray (79 Mass.) 3 (1859).
In the case of Luckett v. Williamson, 37 Mo. 388 at 397 (1866) the court said: "We
do not see how the plaintiff can meet the plea of the statute by insisting that the defendant
has been put in possession, made payment of part of the purchase money, and erected valuable
improvements. These circumstances might be insisted on by the purchaser on a bill for
specific performance, when the statute was pleaded by the vendor; but if the vendee will
waive the right these circumstances conferred upon him, we do not see how the vendor can
insist on them for him." Thus the vendor's suit for specific performance and the defendant's
prayer for the value of the improvements were dismissed.
In Gudgell v. Duvall, 4 J. J. Marsh. (27 Ky.) 229 (1830) restitution was denied for
improvements made by a defaulting plaintiff in performance of an oral agreement to lease
land. In the following cases similar results were reached under oral agreements to purchase
land: Roagh v. Wade, 4 T.B. Mon. (20 Ky.) 523 (1827); Long v. Finger, 74 N.C. 502
(1876); Syme v. Smith, 92 N.C. 338 (1885).
In some of the cases restitution may have been denied because of the historical rule that
recovery for improvements could be had only in equity. See Shreve v. Grimes, 4 Litt. (14 Ky.)
220 at 223 (1823).
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the· question was presented for decision. 14 The defaulting plaintiff
has also been denied restitution for action rendered merely in reliance
upon the unenforceable agreement.15
Since the benefit conferred upon the defendant was apparently the .
same whether the oral agreement was repudiated by him or by the
plaintiff, ,the difference in the above results probably should be attributed to the dimini~hed unjustness of the defendant's retention in the
latter situation. In other words, the plaintiff's repudiation of the unenforceable agreement was regarded as sufficiently inequitable to offset
any unjustness of the defendant in ~ccepting and retaining the plaintiff's performance. The plaintiff's repudiation is not the only motivating factor in denying restitution,16 but some authorities apparently
14 In Sneed v. Bradley, 4 Sneed (36 Tenn.) 301 (1856) the plaintiff, a creditor of the
vendee, filed a bill to reach $200 paid by the vendee to the defendant under an oral agreement
to purchase land for $400 from the latter. Thereafter, the vendee and vendor completely
performed the oral agreement. It was held that the chancellor erred in not dismissing the
plaintiff's bill. In the following cases the lower court erred in overruling a demurrer to the
plaintiff's complaint: Laffey v. Kaufman, 134 Cal. 391, 66 P. 471 (1901); Sennett v. Shehan, 27 Minn. 328, 7 N.W. 266 (1880). In Plummer v. Buclmam, 55 Me. 105 (1867) it
was held the lower court correctly non-suited the plaintiff. In Sims v. Hutchins, 8 Smed. & M.
(16 Miss.) 328 (1847) the court held that a verdict for the plaintiff was manifestly against
the law and the evidence. In Cook v. Griffith, 76 W.Va. 799, 86 S.E. 879 (1915) the lower
court erred in refusing to enter a judgment on a verdict in favor of the defendant. No error
was found in the cases of Perkins v. Allnut, 47 Mont. 13, 130 P. 1 (1913), and Roberts v.
Roesch, 306 Pa. 435, 159 A. 870 (1932), when the lower court denied the plaintiff's motion
for a new trial; though in Day v. Wilson, 83 Ind. 463, 43 Am. Rep. 76 (1882) it was held
error to deny a similar motion made by the defendant.
Restitution has also been denied to the defaulting party who sought to recover by a
cross complaint in a suit to quiet title: Leach v. Rowley, 138 Cal. 709, 72 P. 403 (1903), or
in a suit for specific performance: Hefford v. Lichtman, 116 Misc. 692, 190 N.Y.S. 554
(1921); Cammack v. Prather, (Tex. Civ. App., 1903) 74 S.W. 354; Summers v. Hively, 78
W.Va. 53, 88 S.E. 608 (1916), the same as if the action were at law: Gammon v. Butler, 48
Me. 344 (1861); Coughlin v. Knowles, 7 Mete. (48 Mass.) 57, 39 Am. Dec. 759 (1843);
Keystone Hardware Corp. v. Tague, 246 N.Y. 79, 158 N.E. 27 (1927); Collier v. Coates,
17 Barb. (N.Y.) 471 (1854); Clancy v. Craine, 2 Dev. Eq. (17 N.C.) 363 (1833).
15 In Young v. Pate, 3 J. J. Marsh. (26 Ky.) 100 at 101 (1829) the court said, "He
made the improvements for himself, and not for his vendor, nor at his request, either express
or implied." Farnam v. Davis, 32 N.H. 302 (1855) is to the same effect.
1 6 In most of the cases wherein the defaulting party paid money to the defendant, the
proportion of the total purchase price which was paid prior to his repudiation was less than
ten per cent: Brockhausen v. Bowes, 50 ill. App. 98 (1892) ($100 paid under oral agreement
to pay $3,900); Watkins v. Wells, 303 Ky. 728, 198 S.W. (2d) 662 (1946) ($850 paid
under oral agreement for $10,000 tract of land); Rosenberg v. Deitrick, (D.C. Mass. 1940)
37 F. Supp. 700 ($500 paid under oral agreement for $9,250 tract of Massachusetts land);
Jose v. Aufderheide, 222 Mo. App. 524, 293 S.W. 476 (1926) ($1,000 paid under oral
agreement for $4,500 tract of land); Hathaway & Armstrong v. Hoge, 1 Sadler 119, 1 A. 392
(1885) ($7,300 paid under oral agreement for $15,000 tract of land); Long v. Holben, 35
Pa. D. & C. 323 (1939) ($1,000 paid under oral agreement for $12,500 tract of land); Cobb
v. Hall, 29 Vt. 510, 70 Am. Dec. 432 (1857) ($100 paid under oral agreement for $450
tract of land). A subsequent suit between the same parties is reported in 33 Vt. 233 (1860).
The cases cited in notes 9 and 14, supra, are to the same effect. In this connection it should
be mentioned that the New York Law Revision Commission recommended that the defaulting
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believe that his default in the performance of an unenforceable agreement should be regarded in the same manner as his repudiation of a
valid· contract. In this connection, it has been stated:
"There is no right of restitution against a defendant who is not
in default and who is ready and willing to perform the contract or
to execute a memorandum sufficient to make it enforceable, except
to the extent that such a right would exist if the requirements of
the statute were satisfied and the contract an enforceable one."11
It should be mentioned, however, that even though the plaintiff's
repudiation is treated in the same manner as though the agreement were
enforc.eable, he may still obtain restitution for his partial performance
in states which recognize the doctrine of Britton v. Turner. 18
Even though the majority of jurisdictions regard the repudiation
as a material factor· in the determination of what constitutes an unjust
retention,19 it is frequently difficult to d~termine, in a particular case,
whether the plaintiff or the defendant repudiated the unenforceable
agreement. 20 A controversy ·may arise as to which party was the first to
vendee (under an enforceable agreement) should be allowed to recover his payments in excess
of the vendor's damages, if any, and twenty per cent of the contract price as a kind of penalty
for his repudiation, The proposed statute was not enacted. Patterson, "Restitution for Benefits Conferred by Party in Default under Contract," N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 65 (F) 17 (1942).
In Lanham v. Reinmann, 177 Ore. 193, 160 P. (2d) 318 (1945) the court said at page
198, "The contracting parties agreed that if the vendees failed or refused to comply with
the terms and conditions of the contract, the 'earnest money' should be forfeited • • • as
liquidated damages." Also see Keystone Iron Co. v. Logan, 55 Minn. 537 at 542, 57 N.W.
156 (1893); Long v. Holben, 35 Pa. D. & C. 323 at 325 (1939).
17 CoNTRACTs RESTATEMENT §355 ( 4) (1932); followed in Long v. Holben, 35 Pa.
D. & C. 323 (1939). Italics added.
18 The leading case of Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481, 26 Am. Dec. 713 (1834) supports
the proposition that an employee who wilfully and without cause repudiates a valid contract
to render services for a certain period at a fixed wage, can recover in quantum meruit for the
reasonable value of the services he has rendered, not to exceed the conti:act rate, minus whatever damages resulted from the plaintiff's repudiation. It has been said that the doctrine of
this case has been applied or approved by dictum in eleven jurisdictions. They are Georgia
(dictum), Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina (dictum),
North Dakota (dictum), South Dakota, and Texas (dictum). Patterson, ''Restitution for
Benefits Conferred by Party in Default under Contract," N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 65 (F) 17,
37-38 (1942). For a further discussion of the doctrine of Britton v. Turner see discussion,
infra, p. 958. Also see statute of frauds cases allowing restitution to defaulting plaintiffs,
which are collected, infra, notes 38-42.
19 In the case of Purves v. Martin, 122 Me. 73 at 75, 118 A. 892 (1922), for example,
the court said, "It is settled law that when the non-performance of an oral contract for the
sale of land is on the part of the buyer, he cannot recover payments already made, the seller
not being in fault; but if the seller refuses to perform the contract, the other party not being
in fault can recover the payments he has made." Also see supra, notes 7, 9-15.
20 In the case of Sennett v. Shehan, 27 Minn. ·328, 7 N.W. 266 (1880), for example,
the plaintiff sued for the return of $50 paid under an oral agreement for the purchase of land.
He made no tender of the balance of the purchase price, but claimed that the defendant had
refused to convey. The court emphasized the conditions concurrent in this case, and held that
the lower court.erred in overruling the defendant's demurrer.
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abandon the undertaking,21 or as to whether the conduct of the defendant was such as to excuse the plaintiff from further performance.22 But
the plaintiff must show a legal excuse for his non-performance,23 rather
than merely a moral one.24 The case of Jackson v. Frier2 5 illustrates
another attempt by a plaintiff to avoid the consequences of a finding
that he was in default. In that case the plaintiff brought a claim and
delivery action to recover an automobile which he alleged was delivered to the defendant merely as bailee. The defendant contended that
the automobile was delivered by the plaintiff as partial payment under
an oral agreement to purchase land. It was held that the lower court
erred in directing a verdict for the plaintiff. Such conilicts in testimony,
of course, should be resolved by the jury. 26 In another case the plain;.
tiff alleged an oral agreement and his willingness to perform it, while
the defendant claimed that the real oral agreement embodied different
terms. 27 In other instances the plaintiff admitted his repudiation of an
21 Long v. Holben,
22 Miller, Exrx. v.

35 Pa. D. & C. 323 (1939). .
Kifer, 75 Ind. App. 198, 130 N.E. 278 (1921) involved an oral
agreement to care for defendant for life in return for land. The defendant ordered the
plaintiff to leave, which he did. The plaintiff recovered, but perhaps on the ground that
Indiana recognizes the doctrine of "Britton v. Turner." In Frey v. Stangl, 148 Iowa 522, 125
N.W. 868 (1910) the action was for money paid under an oral agreement for the purchase
of land. Since the defendant left the state without refunding the plaintiff's money, the plaintiff was excused from making a demand therefor. Cf. McDonald v. Beall, 52 Ga. 576 (1874)
(cited supra, note 8).
2 3 In Syme v. Smith, 92 N.C. 338 (1885), for example, the plaintiff's intestate died
before rendering all of the services required of him under an oral agreement for the purchase
of land, and restitution was allowed. Also see CoNTRACTS REsTATllMENT §355(1) and §347,
comment d (1932).
'
24 In the following cases restitution was denied: Sims v. Hutchins, 8 Smed. & M. (16
Miss.) 328, 47 Am. Dec. 90 (1847) (plaintiff was unable to pay); Clancy v. Craine, 2 Dev.
Eq. (17 N.C.) 363 (1833) (plaintiff's business failed and an assignment was made for the
benefit of creditors). Although restitution was allowed in Crawford v. Parsons, 18 N.H. 293
(1846) wherein the plaintiff repudiated the oral agreement to render services in return for
land because of ill health, the case was questioned in Clements v. Marston, 52 N.H. 31 at 39
(1872).
2 5 118 S.C. 449, 110 S.E. 676 (1922). In Venable v. Brown, 31 Ark. 564 (1876) the
plaintiff brought replevin for a mule worth $125 which he was alleged to have delivered to
the defendant under an oral agreement to purchase land for $800. A judgment was entered
for the plaintiff and the defendant's motion for a new trial was overruled. The rulings were
affirmed on appeal, because the lower court sitting without a jury had found that the mule
was not delivered as partial payment under the oral agreement. In Perkins v. Allnut, 47 Mont.
13, 130 P. 1 (1913) the plaintiff sought to recover $837.64 on a demand loan, but the
defendant contended and the jury found that the money was a partial payment under an
oral agreement for the purchase of a $2,500 tract of land.
2 6 Purves v. Martin, 122 Me. 73, 118 A. 892 (1922); Kriger v. Leppel, 42 Minn. 6, 43
N.W. 484 (1889).
2 7 In York v. Washburn, (D.C. Minn. 1902) 118 F. 316, the plaintiff contended that
royalty of 25¢ was to be paid only on ore of Bessemer grade, while the defendant claimed the
royalty of 25¢ per ton was to be paid on all ore taken. A judgment dismissing the plaintiffs
complaint on its merits was affirmed in (C.C.A. 8th, 1904) 129 F. 564. In Mitchell v. McNab, 1 ID. App. 297 (1878) the plaintiff alleged that his services in grading streets were to
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oral agreement, but alleged that the parties had replaced that agreement
with another one, also unenforceable because of the statute of frauds,
which had been repudiated by the defendant. 28
4. Det~rmination of Unjust Retention-Wilful or Jnadvertent

Character of the Plaintiff's Repudiation
Even though, as was pointed out in the last section, restitution is
generally allowed against a defaulting defendant, irrespective of the
wilful or inadvertent character of his repudiation, and is often denied
to a defaulting plaintiff, there are a number of jurisdictions which
allow the defaulting plaintiff to recover in restitution. If it is found
that the plaintiff repudiated the oral agreement, it may be well to
examine the wilful or inadvertent character of his repudiation. For,
although some distinguished authors29 have approved decisions which
deny recovery to wilful defaulters and allow restitution when the repudiation is inadvertent, the distinction is not uniformly followed even
be paid for in cash, but the defendant contended that they were rendered under an oral
agreement whereby certain lots in the defendant's subdivision were to be conveyed to the
plaintiff. The lower court erred in instructing the jury that the terms of the oral agreement
were immaterial. In Brockhausen v. Bowes, 50 ID. App. 98 (1892) a disagreement arose
concerning what land was to be conveyed under the oral agreement. The plaintiff was denied
recovery of $100 paid on the $3,900 purchase price. In Graham v. Healy, 154 App. Div. 76, ·
138 N.Y.S. 611 (1912) a misunderstanding arose concerning the terms of an auction sale.
The plaintiff alleged that she was bidding on only one lot, while the defendant contended
that the highest bidder was also to take nine other lots at the same price per lot. The decision
of the lower court was reversed and judgment was entered for the defendant. In Cook v.
Griffith, 76 W.Va. 799, 86 S.E. 879 (1915) the plaintiff alleged that the oral agreement
was to cover only one lot for which he had already paid, while the defendant claimed that
there were six lots covered by the agreement. Plaintiff was denied recovery of the money paid
under the oral agreement.
28 In Cobb v. Hall, 29 Vt. 510 (1857) the plaintiff was denied recovery for $100 he had
paid under an oral agreement to purchase land for $450. In a subsequent trial between the
same parties, reported in 33 Vt. 233 (1860), however, it appeared that after the trial in 1857,
the parties had renewed their oral agreement concerning the land. But when the plaintiff
tendered the balance of the purchase price under the new oral agreement, the defendant
refused to convey, and the plaintiff was allowed to recover the $100 partial payment. Cf. Crabtree v. Welles, 19 ID. 55 (1857). In that case the vendee had paid $50 to the vendor under
an oral agreement to purchase land for $150. A suit was then brought by the vendor against
the vendee on a separate debt, and the vendee attempted, but failed, to set-off the $50 payment. The vendee then tendered the remainder of the purchase price which the vendor
refused. This action was then filed by the vendee to recover the $50. It was held that the
vendee's attempt to set-off the $50 in the prior suit was no bar here, for nothing was due to
the vendee at that time.
·
29WooDwARD, QuAsr CoNTRAcrs §§166-172 (1913); CoNTRAcrs REsTATEMBNT
§357(1) (1932).
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in the cases of restitution under valid contracts.30 The Uniform Sales
Act, for instance, does not even mention the distinction,31 and it has
also been criticized because it is often difficult to apply. 32 And it would
seem to be inconsistent with the traditional rule that a breach of contract does not constitute a tort, or give rise to a claim for punitive
damages.33
It does not follow, however, that the wilful or inadvertent character
of the plaintiff's repudiation should receive no consideration at all. In
view of the fact that restitution, unlike a contractual recovery, depends
largely upon unjustness, which is determined by examining the inequitable or unjust conduct of the plaintiff as well as that of the defendant, it seems eminently proper to consider the character of the
plaintiff's repudiation along with any other factors which bear upon
the unjustness of the retention.34 Indeed, even to determine the one
who repudiated the unenforceable agreement, which must be done in
cases of restitution, involves an examination of the conduct of both
parties. For an employer does not repudiate the agreement by dismissing an employee if sufficient cause is shown. And cause can be shown
only by looking at the employee's conduct which may range all the way
from the use of improper language, drunkenness, or incompetence to
30WooDWARD, QuAsI CoNTRACTS §§173 et seq. (1913); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS,
rev. ed., §§1473-1477 (1937).
31 Uniform Sales Act §44(1) provides: "Where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity of goods less than he contracted to sell, the buyer may reject them, but if the buyer accepts
or retains the goods so delivered, knowing that the seller is not going to perform the contract
in full, he must pay for them at the contract rate. If, however, the buyer has used or disposed
of the goods delivered before he knows that the seller is not going to perform his contract in
full, the buyer shall not be liable for more than the fair value to hini of the goods so received."
32 Patterson, "Restitution for Benefits Conferred by Party in Default under Contract,"
prepared for the New York Law Revision Commission, N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 65 (F) 17,
53-54 (1942); Laube, "The Right of an Employee Discharged for Cause," 20 MINN. L. REv.
597 at 612-616 (1936).
33 McCORMICK, DAMAGES 637-639 (1935); Note, 34 CoL. L. REv. 1101 (1934);
Laube, "The Defaulting Employee-Britton v. Turner Reviewed," 83 Umv. PA. L. REv.
825 at 833 (1935).
34 A good example is the case of Hawkins v. Beal, 4 Dana. (34 Ky.) 4 (1836). In that
case an honest dispute arose as to whether the land which was to be conveyed under an oral
agreement was to be paid for in "money" or in current bank notes. The vendee, who claimed
he was entitled to pay in bank notes, was permitted to recover for improvements placed upon
the land. The court was not sure of the correct version of the agreement, but was inclined to
regard the vendor's conduct as more unjust than that of the vendee. At page 6, however, the
court warned the vendee that recovery would have been denied ''had it clearly appeared that
the non-execution of the contract was attributable altogether to his wilful delinquency or
fault." Also see discussion supra, pp. 923-92~.
·
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disobedience, disloyalty, or th~ft.35 Further, the character of the repudiation should not be excluded merely because there may be a few
cases that possibly fall in a twilight zone between that which is wilful
and that which is inadvertent.
In spite of the observations in the preceding paragraph, which are
applicable to restitution under valid contracts as well as to restitution
under oral agreements within the statute of frauds, the distinction between an inadvertent and a wilful default has been ignored in many
of the cases, especially when recovery was allowed.36 It should be observed, however, that the plaintiff's conduct, whether wilful or inadvertent, in repudiating a valid contract may be regarded as more unjust
than similar conduct in repudiating an oral agreement that does not
comply with the requirements of the statute. Indeed, the plaintiff may
have to pay damages for his repudiation of a valid contract, but would
not be liable in the latter situation. If the oral agreement is interpreted
as "void" under the particular statute of frauds, 37 the above observation
may be especially applicable. For, there are a number of cases that
have found the defendant's retention was unjust, apparently without
examining the wilful or inadvertent character of the plaintiff's default,
and have allowed restitution for money,38 goods,39 services,40 improve35 Laube, ''The Right of an Employee Discharged for Cause," 20 MINN. L. Rllv. 597 at
612-616 (1936). The headings listed in the text are the ones Professor Laube used :in dis, cussing this problem.
36 Patterson, ''Restitution for Benefits Conferred by Party in Default under Contract,"
prepared for the New York Law Revision Commission, N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 65 (F) 17,
54-55 (1942).
37 See discussion infra p:i_>. 938-940.
38 Nelson v. Shelby Mfg. & Improv. Co., 96 Ala. 515, 11 S. 695 (1892); Burks v.
Douglass, 156 Ky. 462, 161 S.W. 225 (1913); Grace v. Gholson, 159 Ky. 359, 167 S.W.
420 (1914); Scott v. Bush, 26 Mich. 418, 12 Am. Rep. 311 (1873); Wright v. Dickinson,
_67 Mich. 580, 35 N.W. 164, 11 Am. St. Rep. 602 (1887), :in subsequent trial a judgment
for the plaintiff-vendee was reversed on other grounds, 67 Mich. 590, 42 N.W. 849 (1889);
Hooper v. First Exchange Nat. Bank of Coeur D'Alene, (C.C.A. 9th, 1931) 53 F. (2d) 593
(applying Washington law); Reedy v. Ebsen, 60 S.D. 1, 242 N.W. 592 (1932), affd. on
rehearing, 61 S.D. 54, 245 N.W. 908 (1932); Brandeis v. Neustadtl, 13 Wis. 142 (1860);
Durkin v. Machesky, 177 Wis. 595, 188 N.W. 97 (1922); Merten v. Koester, 199 Wis, 79,
225 N.W. 750 (1929); see Flinn v. Barber, 64 Ala. 193 at 197 (1879); Nims v. Sherman,
43 Mich. 45 at 51, 4 N.W. 434 (1880); Alford v. Hood, 214 Mo. App. 481 at 489, 256 S.W.
535 (1923); Brown v. Pollard, 89 Va. 696 at 701, 17 S.E. 6 (1893); Thomas v. Sowards, 25
Wis. 631 at 635 (1870); Tucker v. Grover, 60 Wis. 233 at 238, 19 N.W. 92 (1884). Some
of these cases arose in jurisdictions which recognize the doctrine of Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H.
481, 26 Am. Dec. 713 (1834), discussed supra, note 18.
39Durkin v. Machesky, 177 Wis. 595, 188 N.W. 97 (1922). Cf. Venable v. Brown,
31 Ark. 564 (1876); Jackson v. Frier, 118 S.C. 449, 110 S.E. 676 (1922), both cases cited
supra, note 25.
.
·
40 Comes v. Lamson, 16 Conn. 246. (1844); Tague v. Hayward, 25 Ind. 427 (1865)
(services rendered by minor under oral agreement within the one year provision, of the statute);
Miller, Exrx. v. Kifer, 75 Ind. App. 198, 130 N.E. 278 (1921) (support :in return for land);
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ments,41 or the use and occupation of land42 parted with~ performance
of the "void" agreement.

5. Determination of Unjust Retention-Interpretations of the Statute
of Frauds

In view of the division of the authorities whereby courts usually
have denied restitution to defaulting plaintiffs under the common statuBernier v. Cabot Mfg. Co., 71 Me. 506, 36 Am. Rep. 343 (1880); King v. Welcome, 5 Gray
(71 Mass.) 41 (1855); Freeman v. Foss, 145 Mass. 361, 14 N.E. 141 (1887); Hartwell v.
Young, 67 Hun. 472, 22 N.Y.S. 486 (1893); Mendelsohn v. Banov, 57 S.C. 147, 35 S.E.
499 (1900) (plaintiff rendered services as a tailor under oral agreement whereby $20 was
deducted from each month's pay of $100 and was to be kept by defendant if the plaintiff
failed to work the full year, and it was held that the plaintiff's demurrer to the cross complaint
was properly sustained); Salb v. Campbell, 65 Wis. 405, 27 N.W. 45 (1886) (services as
an apprentice); Koch v. Williams, 82 Wis. 186, 52 N.W. 257 (1892) (architectural services
in return for land); Draheim v. Evison, 112 Wis. 27, 87 N.W. 795 (1901); Chase v. Hinkley,
126 Wis. 75, 105 N.W. 230 (1905); cf. Colonial Brick Co. v. Zimmerman, 255 Mich. 655,
239 N.W. 301 (1931) (both parties were treating the oral agreement as valid); Clark v.
Davidson, 53 Wis. 317, IO N.W. 384 (1881).
In Humphrey v. Johnson, 73 Ind. App. 551, 127 N.E. 819 (1920) the statute of frauds
was satisfied by partial performance, but the court emphasized that the rule of Britton v.
Turner had been adopted in Indiana. And at page 555 the court said: ''Where one enters
into a contract to live with aged persons, to provide for their wants, to nurse them in sickness,
and to care for thein in their helplessness, a relation of trust and confidence is created, in
which the personal element is of unusual significance. It is essential to the proper performance of such a conp:act that mutual respect, confidence, sympathy, and kindness shall prevail.
If these things are lacking, if aversion, hatred, distrust and discontent should arise, the situation would become intolerable-especially for the aged. It is apparent that where the psychological conditions essential to the proper performance of the contract, as above indicated, do
not exist, there is an element of impropriety, not to say danger, in all such contracts, if compensation is made to depend on the continuation of the services until the death of the aged.
These considerations constitute an impelling and indisputable reason for holding that either
party may abandon the contract arbitrarily, and in that event the only rational standard by
which to adjust the rights of the parties is found in the quantum merziit." Also see note, 69
Umv. PA. L. REv. 187 (1921).
41 Masson v. Swan, 6 Heisk. (53 Tenn.) 450 (1871).
42 Brown v. Randolph, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 66, 62 S.W. 981 (1901). In Harvey v.
Daniels, 133 Miss. 40 at 45, 96 S. 746 (1923) the court said, "Until such a contract (within
the statute of frauds) is disaffirmed, the relation of lancllord and tenant does not exist, but
that of vendor and vendee; and where ·the contract is disaffirmed by the vendor, the latter is
not entitled to recover for use and occupation for the period between the purchase and such
disaffirmance•••• Recovery for use and occupation can only be had by the vendor for the
period during which the relation of lancllord and tenant existed. That period did not commence in this case until appellee [vendor] disaffirmed the contract." Also see Bell v. Ellis'
Heirs, 1 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 294 at 297 (1832). Cf. Gould v. Thompson, 4 Mete. ( 45 Mass.)
224 (1842) (plaintiff was held liable for use and occupation of house he had orally agreed to
purchase from the time he took possession until it was destroyed by fire, i.e., four days. In a
prior suit the plaintiff had recovered the money he had paid under the oral agreement); Ayer
v. Hawkes, 11 N.H. 148 (1840) (plaintiff cannot recover for use and occupation until he
returns the money paid to him by the defendant under the oral agreement).
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tory provision that "no action shall be brought,"43 and have often
allowed restitution to defaulting plaintiffs under the other statutes
which provide that the oral agreement "shall be void,"44 it would seem
desirable to examine the evidential weight accorded to oral agreements
under tpese interpretations of the statute of .frauds.
Although the statute of frauds precludes any contractual recovery
which is based upon the unenforceable agreement within its operation,
it would appear that any acts of the parties ought to be admissible in
suits for restitution, if they tend to show a benefit conferred upon the
defendant, the amount of that benefit, or the unjustness of its retention.45 The fact that some of the acts are the same ones which created
the oral agreement, or that they are referred to collectively as the unenforceable agreement, should not render them inadmissible. Indeed,
the terms of the oral agreement must be considered if the subsequent
43 Most of the American jurisdictions followed the phraseology of the fourth section of
the original English Statute of Frauds: Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §58-101; Ark. Stat. Ann.
(1947) §38-101; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) §8293 ("no civil action shall be maintained");
Del. Rev. Code (1935) §3106; D.C. Code (1940) §12-302; Fla. Stat. (1941) §725.01;
Hawaii Rev. Laws (1945) §8721; ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 59, §§1 and 2; Ind. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, 1933) §33-101; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1935) §33-106; Ky. Rev. Stat.
(1948) §371.010; Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 106, §1 ("no action shall be maintained"); Mass.
Ann. Laws (1933) c. 259, §1; Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927)-§8456 ("no action shall be maintained") but in re land §8460 says "every contract ... shall be void"; Miss. Code Ann. (1942)
tit. 2, c. 7, §264; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) §3354; N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 383, §1
in re land ("no action shall be maintained") and §2 ("no action shall be brought") in re
the other statute of frauds provisions, except goods; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) tit. 25, c. 1, §5;
N.C. Gen. Stat. (1943) §22-1, but in re land §22-2 says, "contracts .•. shall be void"; Ohio
Code Ann. (Throckmorton, 1940) §8621; R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 481, §1; S.C. Code
(1942) §7044; S.D. Code (1939) §10.0605 ("contracts shall not be enforceable by action");
Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) §7831; Tex. Stat. (Vernon, 1948) §3995; Vt. Stat.
(1947) §1716; Va. Code Ann. (1950) §11-2; W.Va. Code Ann. (1949) §5392. In Maryland and New Mexico the fourth section of the Engish Statute of Frauds is apparently still
in force: Ehlen v. Selden, 99 Md. 699, 59 A. 120 (1904); Childers v. Talbott, 4 N.M. 168,
16 P. 275; Childers v. Lee, 5 N.M. 576, 25 P. 781 (1891).
In Iowa and Louisiana the statutes merely preclude parol testimony: Iowa Code (1946)
§622.32; La. Civ. Code, 2d ed. (Dart 1945) §2278.
·
44 The statutes in some jurisdictions provide that the oral agreements shall be void:
Ala. Code (1940) tit. 20, §3; Alaska Comp. Laws (1933) §4315; Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935)
c. 71, §12; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §566.104; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §36-202; Nev.
Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929) §1533; N.Y. Laws (Thompson, 1939) Real Property §259;
Ore. Code Ann. (1930) §9-909; Utah Rev. Stat. Ann. (1933) §33-5-4; Wash. Rev. Stat.
Ann. (Remington, 1932) §5825; Wis. Stat. (1947) §241.02 and §240.06; Wyo. Comp.
Stat. Ann. (1945) §5-101.
Other statutes provide that the oral agreements shall be "invalid"; Cal. Civ. Code
(Deering, 1949) §1624; Idaho Code Ann. (1932) §16-505; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947)
§13-606 (this provision also applies to agreements for the sale of goods); N.D. Rev. Code
(1943) §9-0604; Okla. Stat. (1941) §15-136 (this provision also applies to agreements
for the sale of goods).
In Georgia the statutory provision is that oral agreements are not "binding on the
promiser," Ga. Code (1933) tit. 20, §401.
45 See discussion in my article, "Restitution under the Statute of Frauds: What Constitutes a Legal Benefit," to be published subsequently, especially section 1.
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acts of the parties in rendering and accepting partial performance are
to be properly understood. For in the absence of the defendant's request and his promise of return performance embodied in the oral
agreement, the plaintiff's action in conferring a benefit upon him would
resemble that of an officious intermeddler,46 and no recovery in restitution could be obtained. Moreover, if the terms of the unenforceable
agreement were inadmissible, it would seem to be immaterial whether
the agreement was repudiated by the defendant or by the plaintiff.
But, as was pointed out above,47 the character of the repudiation is an
important factor in determining what constitutes an unjust retention.
The legal effect accorded to the oral agreement, and consequently the
unjustness attributed to its repudiation, however, seems to depend, at
least in some instances, upon the variation in phraseology and interpretation of the.particular statute of frauds.
In the leading case of King v. Welcome48 the plaintiff was allowed
to recover for the reasonable value of services he had rendered in partial performance of an oral agreement to work for an entire year from
a day in the future. The defendant relied upon the oral agreement
and the plaintiff's wrongful quitting before the expiration of the term.
The plaintiff pleaded the Massachusetts Statute of Frauds which pro- .
vided that "no action shall be brought . . . unless . . . some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to
be charged therewith." The court said:
"Looking at the mere letter of the statute, the suggestion is
obvious, that no action is brought upon this contract. But the
defendant seeks to 'charge the plaintiff therewith,' to establish it
by proof, to enforce it in a court of law, and to avail himself of its
provisions. An~ if the defense succeeds, the plaintjff is in effect
charged with and made to suffer for the breach of a contract which
he could not enforce, and which could not be enforced against
him.... Nor, by parity of reason, can the plaintiff's breach of it
be set up to defeat his reasonable claim for services rendered." 49
Thus the statute of frauds was interpreted as inapplicable to the executed portion of the oral agreement,50 and the defendant's request and
46 Hope, "Officiousness," 15 CoRN. L. Q. 25 (1929) and 15 CoRN. L. Q. 205 (1930).
Also

see

RESTlTtJT.IoN RESTATEMENT

§2 (1937).

47 See discussion supra, part 3.
48 5 Gray (71 Mass.) 41 (1855).
49Jd. at 43.
liO Swanzey v. Moore, 22
63, 74

m.

Am. Dec. 134 (1859); Kriger v. Leppel, 42 Minn.
6, 43 N.W. 484 (1889); Syme v. Smith, 92 N.C. 338 (1885); Abbott v. Inskip, 29 Ohio
St. 59 (1875); Roberts v. Roesch, 306 Pa. 435, 159 A. 870 (1932).
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promise of return performance embodied therein, were said to determine the rights of the parties in so far as performance had been rendered. 51 ·on the other hand, the statute of frauds was interpreted as
applicable to the executory portion of the oral agreement and, th~refore,
th~ plaintiff's refusal to continue performance was· not inequitable, and
could not be set off against the unjustness of the defendant's retention.
In this connection, the court said:
"In the case at bar, the defense fails .... For it is the whole
contract, of which the defendant seeks to avail himself. His defense is not that as to so much as is executed, as to so much time
the plaintiff has labored, he labored under the contract; and the
price stipulated· is to govern. But he relies upon the contract, not
only so far as it is executed, but so far as it is still executory. He
seeks first to establish the parol agreement as a valid subsisting
contract, and then to charge the plaintiff with a breach of it."52

as

This decision has been followed in Massachusetts53 and in at least one
other state,54 but it has been severely criticized. 55
5l In the case of Kriger v. Leppel, 42 Minn. 6, 43 N.W. 484 (1889), for example, the
plaintiff orally agreed to work as a farm laborer for the defendant for one year at a fuced gross
price which was to be paid at the end of the term. After working for seven months under this
agreement, which was not performable within one year, the plaintiff quit and brought this
suit in quantum memit for the value of the services he had rendered. An order of the lower
court granting the defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict for the
plaintiff was not justified by the evidence was affirmed. But at page 7, the court said: "Oral
contracts of this description are not wholly void. No action, it is true, can be maintained to
enforce them. So far, however, as the parties have voluntarily acted under and performed
them, they are to be taken as defining and measuring the rights of the parties. . . • The
proposition that, though not actionable, they are to be regarded as in force to define the rights
of the parties with respect to what they do under them, disposes, if logically followed, of the
claim of one who, under an agreement for services, within the statute of frauds, renders part
of the services, and without cause refuses to complete them. If, by the terms of the agreement,
he would be entitled to pay for the part performance, the rate fuced by it must be the measure
he is to receive.•.." The case of Philbrook v. Belknap, 6 Vt. 383 (1834) is to "the same
effect. Cf. Price v. Smith Mfg. Co., 53 Cal. App. 303, 200 P. 53 (1921). At page 305 the
court said: "In certain kinds of contracts as where a series of things is to be done, occupying
in the whole more than one year, but each item as it is performed drawing with it a separate
liability therefor, the statute of frauds does not prevent an action upon such items as are
performed within the year to recover the stipulated compensation."
52 King v. Welcome, 5 Gray (71 Mass.) 41 at 45 (1855).
,
53 Freeman v. Foss, 145 Mass. 361, 14 N.E. 141 (1887). But it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the case of King v. Welcome with the following Massachusetts cases:
Coughlin v. Knowles, 7 Mete. (48 Mass.) 57, 39 Am. Dec. 759 (1843); Congdon v. Perry,
13 Gray (79 Mass.) 3 (1859) (restitution denied for services rendered under an oral agreement for the purchase of land); and Riley v. Williams, 123 Mass. 506 (1878), discussed
infra, p. 949.
54 Miller, Turne. v. Kifer, 75 Ind. App. 198, 130 N.E. 278 (1921); cf. Mendelsohn v.
Banov, 57 S.C. 147, 35 S.E. 499 (1900) discussed supra, note 40.
55 Km!NE.n, QUASI CoNI'RACTS 234-238 (1893).
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Professor Keener argued, for examp~e, that the words "to charge
therewith," as used in the statute, mearit that no one should be liable
for the breach of such an agreement. He pointed out that it was one
thing to be held liable for the breach of agreement and quite another
to confer rights upon a defaulting plaintiff. In this regard he said:
"It is a strange result to reach that a statute enacted to give a
defense, where but for the statute the party would be liable for
breach of contract, not only gives a defense, but also confers upon
the party guilty of.a breach of contract a right against the party not
in default."56
Professor Keener's argument carries considerable force, especially when
a dishonest plaintiff is attempting to obtain restitution from an honest
defendant. His criticism of the King case also has been approved by
other authors,57 and the majority of the cases interpreting similar statutory phraseology are in accord with Professor Keener's views.158
In the case of Swanzey v. Moore,5 9 for example, the facts closely
resembled those in the King·case, and the statute of frauds also provided
that "no action shall be brought"; yet restitution was denied. 60 The
court said:
·

"It will be found that executory contracts are only avoided by
the statute of frauds; executed contracts never. A parol contract
which that statute requires to be in writing is as good as any when
performed, or while being performed, or when partly performed,
so far as the performance goes. Suppose this man had worked the
whole year, no one will deny that he would be entitled to the
wages fixed by the contract, and no more. The same measure of .
compensation must satisfy him for the time he did work. Suppose
he had agreed to work for five years for Swanzey (defendant) for
nothing, but just for the love of it, while he would not be bound
to work a day under such a contract, yet if he worked six months
or a year under it he would have to be content with the pleasure
56 Id. at 236.
572 WILUSTON, CoNTRACTs, rev. ed., 1563 (1936); but see WoonwARD, QuAsr CoNTRACTS 154-156 (1913).
'
58 See cases cited supra, notes 9-15.
59 22 ill. 63, 74 Am. Dec. 134 (1859).
60 Restitution was denied in the case of Thompson v. Schurman, 65 Cal. App. (2d) 432,
150 P. (2d) 509 (1944) even though the statute provided that such oral agreements were
"invalid." The court, in interpreting the statute, said at page 438, that the oral agreement
was voidable and "effective as to all purposes for which· it had been made ••• until its enforcement is voided upon the ground that it is not in writing." Note, 27 Calif. L. Rev. 473 at
475 (1939).
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of the exercise for his compensation. Here was a contract that he
should work one year for so much money. Till that service was
performed he was entitled to no pay. Whatever he did under that
contract must be controlled by its terms.... While executory,
either party might repudiate it. When executed or so far as executed, it was as valid and binding as if it had been in writing." 61
And in the case of Roberts v. Roesch62 the defaulting plaintiff was
denied restitution for money paid under an oral agreement for the
purchase of land. After pointing out that such an agreement could not
be specifically enforced, the court said, "It does not follow, however,
that to refuse plaintiff a recovery will be to enforce the contract in viola,tion of the statute."63
In the Swanzey and Roberts cases, therefore, the oral agreement
apparently was -admissible to show that a legal benefit was conferred
upon the defendant, and it was also used to show that the plaintiff's
repudiation was sufficiently inequitable to offset any unjustness in the
defendant's retention of that benefit. In the King case, however, the
oral agreement was admissible to shpw the legal benefit, but it was not
allowed to show the inequitable character of the plaintiff's conduct in
repudiating- the oral agreement which would tend to lessen the unjustness in the defendant's retention. Thus, it would appear, the oral
agreement was accorded less evidential weight in the King case, and
the defaulting plaintiff was allowed to recover in restitution, even
though the statute merely said "no action shall be brought" on such an
oral agreement.
The statute of frauds in the case of Draheim v. Evison, 64 however,
provided that certain oral agreements shall be "void." The plaintiff
in that case rendered services for approximately eight months under an
entire agreement which was not performable within one year. He then
repudiated the oral agreement and brought this action for the reasonable value of the services he had performed. In holding that the lower
court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant, emphasis was placed
upon the interpretation of the oral agreement as "void" under the Wisconsin Statute of Frauds. The court said:
"It [the oral agreement] was void under the statute, not having
been reduced to writing. The parties stood in the same relation
61
62
63
64

Swanzey v. Moore, 22 ill. 63 at 65 (1859).
306 Pa. 435, 159 A. 870 (1932).
Id. at 440.
112 Wis. 27, 87 N.W. 795 (1901).
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to each other as though no express contract existed between them.
A part performance did not relieve the difficulty. It furnished no
ground for a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff, ... and no
basis for a defense in favor of the defendant." 65
It should be observed, however, that notwithstanding the first sentence in the excerpt quoted above, the oral agreement must have been
used in the Draheim case for the purpose of showing that the plaintiff's
services were rendered in response to the defendant's request and promise of return performance, for if not, the plaintiff would have been an
officious intermeddler, and restitution would have been denied. And,
strange as it may seem, practically all of the courts use the oral agreement, rendered "void" by the regular statute of frauds, to show that
the plaintiff was not an officious intermeddler in rendering partial performance. 66
If the "void" agreement is used for this purpose, the Draheim case
would seem to be somewhat analogous to the cas·es that allow restitution under valid· agreements rendered impossible of complete performance. 67 But there would seem to be less motivation for the plaintiff to
perform a "void" or even an unenforceable agreement than there would
be in the case of a valid contract which later became impossible to perform completely. In this regard, the Draheim case seems more like
the cases wherein restitution has been allowed for performance rendered under the mistaken belief that an agreement had been formed. 68
at 29.
See cases cited supra, notes 38-42. But see discussion infra, pp. 942-945, dealing with
real estate broker's statutes.
67 6 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS, rev. ed., §1977 (1938); WoonwAIID, QuAsI CoNTRACTs
§125 (1913).
68 In McDonald v. Lynch, 59 Mo. 350 (1875) there was a mutual mistake as to which
party was to pay the 1872 taxes on the land covered by the oral agreement. It was held that
the lower court erred in refusing the plaintiff's request to give the following instruction: "If
the court believes from the evidence, that the plaintiff paid the sum of $50 to defendant, on
account of a parol agreement for the purchase of larid, the terms of which were and are in
dispute between the parties, and are unsettled and not executed, then the plaintiff is entitled
to recover said sum of $50 so paid." Cf. Brockhausen v. Bowes, 50 ill. App. 98 (1892) and
Graham v. Healy, 154 App. Div. 76, 138 N.Y.S. 611 (1912) both of which are discussed
supra, note 27. They merely involved unilateral mistake by the plaintiffs, and restitution was
denied.
·
Also compare the case of Clark v. Davidson, 53 Wis. 317, 10 N.W. 384 (1881) (plaintiff entered into an oral agreement with an administrator to purchase land but without the
fault of either the plaintiff or the defendant, the plaintiff failed to get title to the land. Plaintiff recovered in restitution).
Similarly restitution has been allowed if a mutual rescission of the oral agreement has
taken place. Grauel v. Rohe, 185 Md. 121, 43 A. (2d) 201 (1945).
65ld.
66
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It should also be noticed that, although the plaintiff has a legal privilege to discontinue performance of the "void" agreement at any time
and a legal excuse for rendering no further performance in the impossibility cases, the plaintiff voluntarily repudiated the oral agreement in
the former situation, while there is no repudiation by the parties in the
impossibility cases. 69 Thus, if the plaintiff's conduct is inequitable at
all in the cases involving impossibility of performance, it would seem to
be less so, than it is in the Draheim case.
The last sentence in the above excerpt from the Draheim opinion
shows, however, that the oral .agreement was not used for the purpose
of showing that the plamtiff's repudiation was inequitable. The King
case also took this view of th~ plaintiff's repudiation of the oral agreement but, it may be argued, there is more justification for it in the
Draheim case, because of the difference in the phraseology of the statutes involved. Although damages cannot be obtained from the plaintiff for his breach of an oral agreement within the operation of either
type of statute, it may be contended that he is more unjust in repudiating an existing agreement, valid except for the purpose of maintaining a contractual action upon it, than he is in refusing to continue
performance of a "void" agreement. If this is true, there would seem
to be more unjustness in the defendant's retention of the benefit in the
latter situation. One court, after.examining the authorities, and pointing out that its statute rendered the oral agreement "void," allowed
restitution and said, "The difference in the rulings [concerning the
defaulting plaintiff's right to restitution] appears to depend upon the
form and interpretation of the statute of fyauds." 70
On the other hand, it may be ·argued, as one writer suggested, that
the _"void" phraseology was accidentally adopted in New York and
69WoonwARD, QuASI CoNTRAC'l's 197 (1913) states, "Moreover, though there are
authorities to the contrary, it seems clear that since the plaintiff is not guilty of breach of
contract there shoµld be no deduction for damages suffered by the defendant by reason of the
plaintiff's ina,bility to complete performance."
.
10 Reedy v. Ebsen, 60 S.D. 1 at 3, 242 N.W. 592 (1932), affd. on rehearing, 61 S.D.
54, 245 N.W. 908 (1932). In Shumway v. Kitzman, 28 S.D. 577 at 582, 1_34 N.W. 325
(1912) the court said: ''Much of.the apparent conflict found in the reported decisions comes
from the different statutory provisions of the several states." Also see 2 WILLISTON, CoN'rRA.C'l'S, rev. ed., 1520 (1936), wherein it was said that in some instances "the fact that the
local Statute of Frauds declared that contracts within its terms were 'void' is the decisive
point." But he cites Chambers v. Kirkpatrick, 142 Wash. 630, 253 P. 1074 (1927) which
invofved a real estate broker statute rather than a provision of the regular statute of frauds.
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blindly followed in other jurisdictions.71 Further, the difference in the
interpretations based upon the variation in phraseology in the original
statute of frauds 72 has been abandoned in England,73 and it is not recognized by the majority of the courts in the United States.74 In this connection the Restatement of Contracts states:
"The right of restitution is not dependent upon the exact
wording of the statute with regard to the express contract; it is
immaterial whether the statute provides that no action shall be
brought or that a contract within its terms is declared to be 'void'
or 'unenforceable.' " 75
But, even though little justification may exist for adopting the various
interpretations of the stiitute, as discussed above,76 except that they
71 Page, ''The Effect of Failure to Comply with the Wisconsin Statute of Frauds." 4
Wxs. L. REv. 323 at 325 (1928) says, ''The change from 'no action shall be brought' to 'such
contract should be void' seems thus to have been made in New York rather by accident, and to
secure an apparent uniformity throughout the chapter, [which also dealt with fraudulent
conveyances] than to change the effect of the statute; and the New York form of the statute
seems to have been adopted in Michigan, and later in Wisconsin, without realizing, at least
at the outset, that the change of the language might make necessary or justify a change in
meaning. Indeed, the difference in language seems to have been disregarded at nrst by the
courts: although, eventually, farreaching consequences have followed from it in Wisconsin."
72 29 Car. II, c. 3, §§4 and 17. The leading case of Leroux v. Brown, 12 C.B. 801, 138
Eng. Rep. 1119 (1852) emphasized the distinction between section four which said, in part,
that "no action shall be brought," and section seventeen which provided, in part, that "no
contract ... shall be allowed to be good."
73 In Britain v. Rossiter, 11 Q.B.D. 123 at 127 (1879) Brett, L. J. said of a contract
within section four that in his opinion "no distinction exists between the 4th and 17th sections
of the statute." And Lord Blackburn in Maddison v. Alderson, 8 A.C. 467 at 488 (1883)
said: "I think it is now finally settled that the true construction of the Statute of Frauds,
both the 4th and the 17th sections, is not to render contracts within them void, still less illegal,
but is to render the kind of evidence required indispensable when it is sought to enforce the
contract." Section seventeen of the original statute was replaced on February 20, 1894, by
section four of the English Sale of Goods Act, 56 and 57 Viet., c. 71, §4, which provided, in
part, that "a contract .•. shall not be enforceable by action."
74 In Bird v. Monroe, 66 Me. 337 at 343 (1877), for example, the court said: "A distinction is attempted to be set up between the meaning to be given to R.S., c. 111, Sec. 4,
where it is provided that no unwritten contract for the sale of goods 'shall be valid' and that
to be given to the several preceding sections where it provided that upon certain other kinds
of unwritten contracts 'no action shall be maintained'; the position taken being that in the
former case the contract is void, and in the other cases only voidable perhaps, or not enforceable by suit at law. But the distinction is without any essential difference, and is now so
regarded by authors generally and in most of the decided cases. All the sections referred to
rest upon precisely the same policy." To the same effect is Townsend v. Hargraves, 118 Mass.
325 (1875). For other authorities see 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrrs, rev. ed., §531, note 2
(1936).
It should also be mentioned that section four of the Uniform Sales Act, which has been
adopted in at least thirty-four states and three territories, followed the language of the English
Sale of Goods Act stated supra, note 73.
75 CoNTRAcrrs REsTATEMENT §355, comment c (1932).
7G See discussion supra, pp. 933-942.
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provide a means of minimizing the harshness of the general rule which
denies restitution to defaulting plaintiffs, the fact remains that different
interpretations have been adopted, in some instances, and of the cases
allowing restitution to defaulting plaintiffs, more of them are found in
jurisdictions where the oral agreement is interpreted as "void" under
the particular statute of frauds. 77
In this connection, let us also examine the "void" phraseology usually employed in tlie analogous statutes dealing with the real estate
broker agreements.78 The typical real estate broker statute provides, in
part, as follows:
"In the following cases every agreement shall be void unless
such agreement or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing
and subscribed by the party to be charged therewith: ... (5)
Every' agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to
purchase or sell real estate for compensation." 79
In Seifert v. Dirk,80 the word "void" used in the Wisconsin statute
regarding brokers was interpreted as having the same effect as the
"void" phraseology employed in that state's regular statute of frauds.
The "void" agreement was used, as in Draheim v. Evison81 discussed
above, to show that the plaintiff was not an officious intermeddler, and
could ~b_tain restitution, though a recovery on the contract, of course,
•

I

77 See cases cited supra, notes 38-42. In the case of Scott v. Bush, 26 Mich. 418, 12 Am.
Rep. 311 (1873) restitution was allowed notwithstanding a stipulation in the "void" agreement for the purchase of lands that the money paid by the plaintiff was to be forfeited as
liquidatea damages.
78 Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §58-101(7) ("no action shall be brought"); Cal. Civ. Code
(Deering, 1949) §1624(5) ("invalid"); Hawaii Rev. Laws (1945) §8721(6) ("no action
shall be brought"); Idaho Code Ann. (1932) §16-508 ("no contract ••• shall be valid"); Ind.
Stat. Ann. (~urns, 1933) §33-104 ("no contract ••• shall be valid"); Mich. Comp. Laws
(1948) §566.104 ("void"); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §13.606(6) ("invalid"); Neb.
Rev. Stat. (1943) §36-107 ("void"); N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §25: 1-9 ("except as ••• otherwise provided, no broker ••• shall be entitled to any commission"); Ore. Code Ann. (1930)
§9-909(8) ("void"); Utah Rev. Stat. (1933) §33-5-4(5) ("void"); Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann.
(Remington, 1932) §5825(5) ("void"); Wis. Stat. (1947) §240.10 ("void"). Although
Ohio added a real estate broker provision to its statute of frauds in Ohio Laws (1925) p. 104,
it was later repealed in Ohio Laws (1931) p. llO. Also see discussion in comment, 23 WASH.
L. R:Ev. 116 (1948).
79 Utah Rev. Stat. (1933) §33-5-4(5). Also see statutes cited supra, note 78.
80 175 Wis. 220, 184 N.W. 698 (1921) (three judges dissenting). The court said at
p. 225, "Such right to recover quantum meruit is grounded in the common law•••• The substance of the old English statute of frauds, aimed to prevent perjury and the establishment of
unjust and unfounded claims ••• relating to contracts has continuously appeared as a part of
our statutory law sinc,e at least as early as the revision of 1849••.• The new statute ••• is
no more drastic or emphatic as to the necessity of a writing and the effect of the failure thereof
than is the language of the other provisions of the statute of frauds above mentioned." This
case was criticized in note, 31 YALB L.J. 447 (1922).
81 ll2 Wis. 27, 87 N.W. 795 (1901), discussed supra, pp. 938-940.
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would be precluded. Notwithstanding the fact that the word "void"
was used in both of the Wisconsin statutes, however, the Seifert case
was expressly overruled in Hale -v. Kreisel, 82 and the plaintiff was
denied restitution even against a defaulting defendant. Thus the "void"
agreement apparently could not be used to negate the plaintiff's officiousness, to show that his services were beneficial to the defendant, or
that the latter's repudiation of the agreement and retention of a benefit
was unjust. The Hale case represents the generally accepted view that
the broker statutes prevent recovery for services either in restitution or
on the contract.83 And a few jurisdictions have apparently adopted this
view even though the particular real estate broker statute did not employ the word "void."84
In app~oving the difference between· the interpretation of "void"
as used in the broker statutes, and as employed in the regular statute
of frauds, one court said:
"If this rule [of allowing restitution for services rendered in
performance of oral agreements -void under the statute of frauds]
is to be made applica'!:>le to this section [i.e. the broker provision]
of the statute of frauds, it would practically nullify the effect of the
statute, Demands for commissions by real estate brokers are not
usually made or pressed until the contract is performed. This being so, a recovery could be had, in nearly every instance...."85
But a similar argument could be advanced against restitution for services rendered under an oral agreement which did not comply with the
one year provision of the regular statute of frauds; yet restitution .is
allowed in that situation. 86 But the two types of cases are clearly distinguishable.
.
It should· be observed that the one who employs a broker is primarily, if not solely, interested in the final result. It is the completing
of the deal, or at least the final location of someone who is ready,
willing, and able to buy the land in question that constitutes the
performance of the oral agreement. Ordinarily, the specific services
to be rendered by the broker are not mentioned in the agreement, and
82 194 Wis. 271, 215 N.W. 227 (1927); note, 4 Wxs. L. Rnv. 379 (1928).
83 For a collection 0£ the authorities see notes 17 A.L.R. 891 (1922); 56

A.L.R. 783
(1928). Also see notes, 6 Mnm. L. REv. 167 (1922); 12 MARQ. L. REv. 81 (1927).
84 Note, 1 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 83 (1927).
, 85 Paul v. Graham, 193 Mich. 447 at 451, 160 N.W. 616 (1916).
86 Frazer v. Howe, 106 ill. 563 (1883); Wonsettler v. Lee, 40 Kan. 367, 19 P. 862
(1888); Spinney v. Hill, 81 Minn. 316, 84 N.W. 116 (1900); McGilchrist v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 138 Ore. 679, 7 P. (2d) 982 (1932); Fabian v. Wasatch Orchard Co., 41 Utah
404, 125 P. 860 (1912).
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the contract price or commission, which is promised presumably as
compensation for the broker's services actually bears little, if any, relation to the quantity or burdensomeness of the services later rendered
by the broker. Thus, the broker's services, for the most part, merely
constitute preparatory reliance action, while the services in the regular
statute of frauds cases are often, though not always, rendered in performance of the oral agreement. The effect of this vital distinction in
suits for restitution under the statute of frauds is discussed elsewhere.87 It is sufficient at this point to say that a weaker case for
allowing restitution is presented by reliance action than is presented
by performance-of the oral agreement.
Further, the landowner sometimes merely makes an offer to form
a unilateral contract with the real estate broker, and the oral arrangement amounts to an "all or nothing" proposition. Thus a claim for
quantum meruit arising from such a business gamble88 should perhaps
be regarded with less favor than is true in the ordinary suit for restitution.
Moreover, restitution for a real estate broker's services may be
objectionable because the amount of such a recovery is likely to produce
exactly the same result as though the oral agreement itself had been
enforced. And, as discussed elsewhere,89 such results would seem to
"fly in the teeth" of the statute. In this connection the Restatement
of Restitution states:
"Where the quasi-contractual remedy would be substantially
that which is permitted under the terms of the contract and would
substantially defeat the purpose of the statute (see Illustration 5,
{dealing with brokers]), recovery may be denied." 90
Finally, there may be a greater need in the broker situation for
protecting defendants against officious intermeddlers seeking to estab.lish claims for restitution by means of perjured testimony. In this
\Connection one court said:
"It is. a matter of common knowledge that before the enactment of this statute numerous suits were being instituted from
time to time by agents and brokers who claimed commissions on
87 See discussion in my article, "Restitution under the Statute of Frauds: What Constitutes a Legal Benefit,'' to be published subsequently, especially part II.
.
88 Llewellyn, "Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, II,'' 48 YALE L.J. 779
at 815 (1939).
89 See discussion in my article, ''Restitution Under the Statute of Frauds: "What Constitutes a Legal Benefit," to be published subsequently, section 5.
90 RBsnTUTION RBsTATBMllNT §62, comment b (1937).
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sales of land, on the ground that they had been instrumental in
procuring purchasers, and these claims were often resisted by the
defendants, because, as alleged, there was absolutely no basis for
them. On the other hand, brokers and agents complained that
owners, when sales were once effected by the agents, often after
an expenditure of great effort, were given to repudiating their
honest obligations. An examination of court records will reveal
the contradictory testimony of the interested parties in such cases,
and show the extreme difficulty imposed on courts and juries in
ascertaining the truth. No doubt the principal· motives which
actuated the members of the General Assembly in enacting the
statute was to put an end to such disputes, and prevent fraud and
perjury...."91
Although one writer has emphasized the broker's knowledge that the
oral agreement was "void," 92 the policy argument, mentioned in the
above excerpt, has been advanced by other authors, and seems to underlie the majority of the decisions wherein the real estate brokers have
been denied quantum meruit recovery. 93 It was probably also in recognition of this policy that a real estate broker was denied recovery in
deceit,94 and that two states enacted criminal statutes to deal with the
broker problem. 95
It would seem, therefore, that ample justification exists for placing
a different interpretation upon the "void" terminology as employed
91 Selvage v. Talbott, 175 Ind. 648 at 652,
92 Note, 42 CoL. L. REv. 312 (1942).

95 N.E. 114 (1911).

93 One author, after examining the authorities, said, "The only satisfactory explanation
[for interpreting the broker provisioJ;l differently from the usual provisions of the statute of
frauds] seems to be .•• that the danger of perjured claims by real estate brokers is so great
that the statutory addition in question [i.e. relating to brokers] must be taken to enact a rule
of policy against oral contracts of brokers." Note, 16 CALIP. L. REv. 442 at 446 (1928).
In accord with this view is note, 31 YALE L.J. 447 (1922).
94 Krogerv. Baur, 46 Cal. App. (2d) 801, 117 P. (2d) 50 (1941) (broker sued in deceit
alleging fraudnlent oral promise to pay commission, and the court held that the defendant's
demurrer to the complaint was properly sustained). Note, 42 CoL. L. REv. 312 at 314
(1942) collects the authorities, and in criticizing the Kroger case, points out that recovery in
deceit has been allowed when an oral promise within the regular statute of frauds was made
without any intention of performing it.
95 In N.Y. Laws (1901), c. 128, p. 312, N.Y. Penal Code, §640d, it was made a misdemeanor to offer real estate for sale in certain classes of cities unless the authority or contract
of employment was in writing. This statute was declared constitutional in Whiteley v. Terry,
83 App. Div. 197, 82 N.Y.S. 89 (1903), but was later declared unconstitutional in Fisher
Co. v. Woods, 187 N.Y. 90, 79 N.E. 836 (1907). In Mo. Acts (1903) p. 161, a provision
very similar to that in New York was enacted. lt was applied to deny any commissions to an
agent or broker under an oral agreement or employment in Finley v. Handley, 121 Mo. App.
358, 98 S.W. 803 (1906) and in Rothwell v. Gibson, 121 Mo. App. 279, 98 S.W. 801
(1906) but the Missouri statute was also declared unconstitutional ii;i. Woolley v. Mears,
226 Mo. 41, 125 S.W. 1112 (1910).
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in the broker statutes, and as used in the regular statute of frauds, and
that the underlying policy against real estate brokers, in effect, prevents the :6.ncling of an unjust retention of their services even by a
defaulting defendant.

6. Determination of Unjust Retention-Extent of
Performance Rendered
Another factor to be considered in the determination of what constitutes unjust retention is the extent of performance rendered by the
plaintiff before he repudiated the oral agreement which did not comply
with the statute of frauds. Since the statute neither renders such
agreements illegal, nor discourages their performance,96 it would seem
that a plaintiff who partially performed the oral agreement before his
repudiation should be regarded more favorably than one who renders
no performance at all. In other words, it seems worse to repudiate an
agreement in its entirety than merely to repudiate a part of it. In the
cases of restitution under a valid contract thi~ principle is recognized
by the doctrines of substantial performance,97 and the severability of
contracts,98 with the result that defaulting plaintiffs who have partially
performed are sometimes allowed to recover in whole or in part on
the contract, while defaulting plaintiffs who have not performed at all
are denied recovery for loss suffered by reason of their disappointed
expectations. Similarly, in the cases of restitution under the statute
of frauds, the defaulting plaintiff who has partially performed thereby
showed at least some good faith, and is sometimes allowed to recover
in restitution. For, in some instances, as was discussed above, the oral
agreement has been accorded evidential weight for the purpose of
determining the rights of the parties in so far as performance has been
rendered.99
·
96 In Oxborough v. St. Martin, 169 Minn. 72, 210 N.W. 854 (1926) the court said,
at page 73, "It is not morally wrong to make or keep an oral agreement that falls within the
statute of frauds, nor is there any statute which forbids entering such a contract." Also see
Philbrook v. Belknap, 6 Vt. 383 at 386 (1834).
.
97 Ballantine, "Forfeiture for Breach of Contract," 5 MINN. L. REv. 329 (1921), reprinted in SELllCTED READINGS ON THE LAw OF CoNI'RACTS 943 (1931); Patterson, "Restitution for Benefits Conferred by Party in Default Under Contract,'' prepared for the New
York Law Revision Commission, N.Y. Legis. Doc, No. 65 CF) 17, 27 (1942); Wolff, "Substantial Performance of Contracts in New York,'' 16 CoRN. L. Q. 180 (1931); note, 97 UNIV.
PA. L. REv. 884 (1949).
,
98 McGowAN, THE DIVISIBILITY oF EMPLOYMENT CoNrRACTS,'' 21 lowA L. REv. 50
(1935); Patterson, "Restitution for Benefits Conferred by Party in Default under Contract,''
prepared for the New York Law Revision Commission, N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 65 CF) 17, 28
(1942).
99 See cases cited supra, note 51.
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From the discussion of the preceding paragraph, it seems reasonable
to infer that the plaintiff who has completely performed his part of
an unenforceable agreement is more deserving of relief and less unjust
than one who has only partially performed.100 It was so held in the
case of Koch v. Williams. 101 In that case the plaintiff, an architect,
orally agreed to prepare plans for a certain building and to superintend
its construction in return for the conveyance of a designated lot. After
the plaintiff had completely performed the services as agreed, he re- '
pudiated the oral agreement and refused to accept the conveyance of
the land. The court interpreted the oral agreement as "void" under
the. Wisconsin Statute of Frauds, and allowed the plaintiff to recover
for the reasonable value of the services he had rendered, apparently
irrespective of whether or not that value exceeded the value of the
land promised by the defendant. In support of this result, one may
argue that since the oral agreement was "void," it should not be imposed
as the upper limit on the amount of the recovery, and the plaintiff's
refusal to accept the defendant's promised p~rformance is not unjust
or inequitable. Thus, the defendant's retention would appear to be
unjust, and restitution should be allowed.
But the unjustness of the defendant's retention may also have been
affected by the type and non-returnability of the plaintiff's performance. For the Koch case is unlike the common situation in which the
plaintiff has parted with money for land and is merely seeking, by
restitution, a return of the same type of benefit with which he had
parted.102 It is also unlike the usual situation in which the plaintiff
has parted with goods, services, or land in performance of an oral
agreement in return for the defendant's promise to pay money.103
In the Koch case the defendant never agreed to pay for the plaintiff's
services in money. He merely promised to convey land, which perhaps
was not very salable, in return for the plaintiff's services. Although
restitution is frequently allowed against defaulting defendants even
though neither party to the oral agreement promised money in return
for the other's performance/ 04 it should be emphasized that the de100 Cf. Crabtree v. Welles, 19 ill. 55 (1857), discussed supra, note
101 82 Wis. 186, 52 N.W. 257 (1892).
.
102 An example is the case of Swift v. Swift, 46 Cal. 267 (1873).

28.

Also see cases cited
supra, note 38.
103 An example is the case of Mendelsohn v. Banov, 57 S.C. 147, 35 S.E. 499 (1900),
discussed supra, note 40.
104 This situation, as well as those mentioned in notes 102 and 103, supra, are discussed
in another article entitled, ''Restitution under the Statute of Frauds: Measurement of the
Legal Benefit Unjustly Retained," 15 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1950),
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fendant in the Koch case did not have the choice of conveying the
land to the plaintiff as agreed, or of returning the services. For the
services were consumed as they were rendered, and this occurred before
the plaintiff's refusal to accept the defendant's promised performance.
Thus, the defendant probably accepted the services under the reasonable belief that they were being rendered in expectation of the designated land. And, except for the above-mentioned refusal by the
plaintiff, the defendant would have rendered the exact mode and
quantity of compensation agreed upon by the parties. To require
the defendant to pay the reasonable value of the plaintiff's services
when he only promised to convey land, is to allow the "void" agreement to be used for 'the purpose of showing the defendant's request
and promise of return performance, while denying its use for the
purpose of showing the character or value of that return performance.
Thus, the measure of recovery adopted in the Koch case may impose
a hardship upon the defendant.105
On the other hand, the plaintiff who rendered complete performance of the oral agreement and then merely refused to accept the
defendant's performance would seem to be less unjust a:iid more
deserving of restitution than one who repudiated the oral agreement
after he had rendered only partial performance. And, the damages
caused by his refusal to accept the defendant's performance probably
would be much smaller than the benefit the defendant derived from
the plaintiff's complete perform.ance. Since the plaintiff cannot recover
on the unenforceable agreement because of the statute of frauds, it
seems evident that a considerable forfeiture might be imposed upon the
plaintiff if restitution is denied.106 Of course, no injustice would result
so long as the plaintiff could obtain the land promised by the defendant.
But, if the land is no longer obtainable, it would seem that an equitable
105 In this connection the CoNTRACTs RESTATEMENT §357, comment f (1932), states:
"Even though the plaintiff's breach is wilful and without semblance of excuse, the defendant·
must restore the excess of benefit over harm if, with knowledge that the breach has occurred
or is impending, he assents to the part performance, or retains it or accepts the benefit of it
unreasonably. If the part performance is received without such knowledge and is of such a
character that it cannot be returned in specie without unreasonable difficulty.or sacrifice, it
·may be retained without making restitution, even though it exceeds the injury. Such is sometimes the case when the part performance has been incorporated with the defendant's land or
goods. Doubts in cases of this kind are resolved in favor of the plaintiff, in order to avoid a
forfeiture in excess of harm suffered." It should be mentioned, that this excerpt is applicable
not only to enforceable agreements, but to the statute of frauds cases of restitution as well. See
discussion supra, at note 17.
106 Cf. this situation with restitution under a valid contract. Professor Woodward devotes
an entire chapte~ in his book to this problem. WooDWARD, QuASI CoNTRA.c-rs, c. 19 (1913).
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result might be secured by allowing restitution in value, providing
the recovery was limited to the value of the land the defendant had
promised to convey.
In the case of Riley 11. Williams,1° 7 however, restitution was denied
on a set of facts which closely resembled those in the Koch case, except
that the Massachusetts Statute of Frauds stated, "no action shall be
brought" on the oral agreement. After the plaintiff had completely
performed his part of the unenforceable agreement to build a street
(in the Riley case) he refused to accept the land and blacksmith work
which the defendant had promised in return therefor. The court, in
denying restitution, emphasized the willingness of the defendant to
perform the oral agreement, and said:
"It is not for the plaintiff to object that this special contract
was not binding because it was not in writing. It was wholly
immaterial that no action could_ be maintained on this special
contract, because it was not reduced to writing, if the defendants
were willing and ready at all times to carry it into full effect. The
·plaintiff cannot force the defendants to take their stand upon the
statute."108
Although the Riley case is in accord with the generally accepted
view that a defaulting plaintiff should not be allowed to recover in
restitution, it is inconsistent with the Massachusetts case of King 11.
W elcome109 which permitted a defaulting plaintiff who had only
partially performed the unenforceable agreement to obtain restitution.
The Riley case, and others in accord with it,110 are also inconsistent
with the Koch decision, unless the difference in the results is attributed
to the difference in the interpretations of the respective statutes of
frauds.
107 123 Mass. 506 (1878).
10s Id. at 510.
109 King v. Welcome, 5 Gray

(71 Mass.) 41· (1855). This case is discussed supra, pp.
935-936.
110 Galway v. Shields, 66 Mo. 313, 27 Am. Rep. 351 (1877) (goods delivered under an
oral agreement to purchase land); Green v. North Carolina Railroad Co., 77 N.C. 95 (1877)
(cord wood delivered under an oral agreement to purchase land); Hays Drilling Co. v. Sartain, 108 Okla. 181, 235 P. 615 (1925). Also see WooDwARD, QuAsr CoNTRACTs §100
(1913).
The following cases involved factual situations analogous to the Riley case, except that
the defaulting plaintiff only rendered partial performance before his repudiation of the oral
agreement. Restitution was denied. Colorado Lumber, Land, & Improvement Co. v. Dustin,
38 Colo. 398, 87 P. ll42 (1906) (services for land); Mitchell v. McNab, l ill. App. 297
(1878) (services for land); Congdon v. Perry, 13 Gray (79 Mass.) 3 (1859) (services for
land).
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7. Determination of Unjust Ret(3ntion-Failure to Make
Restoration

In many <?f the cases of restitution under oral agreements which
do not comply with the statute of frauds, both parties received benefits
from the other's performance prior to the repudiation of the agreement.
In some instances, the plaintiff's failure to make restoration of the
benefit he received before bringing suit for restitution has been regarded
as sufficiently unjust to bar any recovery by him.111 But, on the other
hand, the plaintiff is sometimes allowed to recover in restitution notwithstanding his failure to restore the benefit he received from the
defendant.112 In the latter situation, the problem is posed of determining the net legal benefit that is unjustly retained by the defendant.
In the cas~ of Miller v. Metz,113 for example, both parties had
received benefit under an unenforceable agreement, and the upper
court approved the following instruction which had been given to the
Jury:

"If the plaintiff recovered, he was entitled to receive the
amount of cash paid by him on the contract, and the reasonable
value of his services in working the farm, after deducting the income of the farm received by him."114
In jurisdictions wherein restitution is denied to the party who has
repudiated the oral agreement,115 however, this approach to the problem
might be objectionable. For it appears incongruous to allow the
m. In Abbott v. Draper, 4 Denio (N.Y.) 51 (1847) the plaintiff parted with store goods
under an oral agreement for the purchase of land. At page 53 the court said, ''If h~ [the
plaintiff] can recover at all so long as the vendor is not in the wrong, he must, at the least,
first restore the possession, and demand the repayment of the money." A verdict was for the
defendant, and a judgment entered thereon was affirmed on appeal. To the same effect are:
Shreve v. Grimes, 4 Litt. (14 Ky.) 220 (1823); Luckett v. Williamson, 37 Mo. 388 (1866).
Cf. Parham v. Kennedy, 60 Ga. App. 52, 2 S.E. (2d) 765 (1939) (plaintiff, who took
possession of land under an oral five year lease as payment for materials furnished to the
defendant, was not entitled to a materialman's lien until he had made restoration to the
defendant).
112 In Miller v. Roberts, 169 Mass. 134, 47 N.E. 585 (1897) the plaintiff sought restitution for a house and lot he had conveyed to a third person under an oral agreement wherein
· the defendant had promised to convey his farm to the plaintiff. The plaini:iff received some
items of personalty from the farm but the defendant repudiated the oral agreement and
conveyed the farm to another party. After pointing out that the defendant's repudiation
rendered inapplicable the rule that the plaintiff must make restoration before bringing suit,
the court said at page 147, ''he [the plaintiff] was not obliged to restore the small articles of
personal property which he had used under the contract. Of course he must account for them,
but his right to sue stands upon independent grounds." Also see CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT
§349 (1932) concerning the "necessity of returning the consideration received by the plaintiff."
11s 103 Wis. 220, 79 N.W. 213 (1899).
114 Id. at 224.
115 See cases cited supra, notes 9-15•.
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defaulting defendant to recover for his own performance by way
of defense, when he could have obtained no recovery if he ·had been
the plaintiff.116 Nevertheless, it has been followed in numerous
decisions.117 Restitution may still be denied, of course, if it is found
that the plaintiff received more benefit than he conferred upon the
defendant.118
A slightly different approach in the determination of the net benefit
is to consider the plaintiff's failure to make restoration along with all
of the other circumstances that are germane to the relative unjustness
of the parties: A good illustration of this view is found in the case of
Richards v. Allen.119 In that action the plaintiff sought restitution for
the value of brick and oxen delivered to the defendant as partial compensation for a tract of land which the latter orally agreed to convey
to .him. Although the plaintiff was allowed to take possession and
occupy the land ,for many years, the defendant never executed the
conveyance. And finally, the defendant repudiated the unenforceable
agreement by conveying the land to another party. After pointing
116 Kmoom, QoASr CoNTBACTS 284 (1893).
117 In the case of Dix v. Marcy, 116 Mass. 416 (1875) the plaintiff conveyed his fann
to the defendant under an oral agreement whereby the latter promised to support the plaintiff
and his family and to give a mortgage on the land as security for his performance. After furnishing some support the defendant repudiated the oral agreement, and the plaintiff brought
this suit to recover the value of the land conveyed. At page 418 the court said, "In this case
the value of the support furnished to the plaintiff by the defendant under the oral agreement,
and before its rescission, was properly deducted from the value of the fann, and the plaintiff
was entitled to recover the value so found." The following cases are to the same effect: Reid
v. Reid, 141 Ky. 402, 133 S.W. 219 (1911) (plaintiff sought to recover $295 which he had
paid to the defendant under an oral agreement as partial compensation for a tract of timber
land, but he was denied recovery because he had already taken off more timber than the
amount of the purchase money paid by him); Day v. New York Central R. Co., 51 N.Y. 583
(1873) (the plaintiff sued for the value of land conveyed to the defendant under an oral
agreement whereby the defendant was to stop its trains so the plaintiff would receive the
business of feeding the stock transported over this portion of the defendant's lines, but
recovery was denied because the plaintiff had already made profits of $6,000 which was more
than the value of the land); Masson v. Swan, 6 Heisk. (53 Tenn.) 450 (1871) (plaintiff
had orally agreed to purchase a lot, and in reliance thereon he made permanent improvements,
paid insurance premiums, and taxes, and he was allowed to recover the enhanced value of
the land by reason of the improvements, plus the amount of taxes paid, less a deduction of the
amount of rents); Brooke Smith Realty Co. v~ Graham, (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) 258 S.W.
513 (plaintiff recovered money paid under an oral agreement to buy a hotel less a deduction
for increased r~t on the improved premises); Clark v. Davidson, 53 Wis. 317, 10 N.W. 384
(1881) (plaintiff rendered services, provided seed, and made improvements under an oral
agreement for the purchase of a tract of land, but the defendant was unable to furnish a good
title thereto. The plaintiff was allowed to recover for what he had parted with "over and
above the value of·the crops grown upon the farm"); Miller v. Metz, 103 Wis. 220, 79 N.W.
213 (1899), discussed in the text supra, at note 113.
11s Reid v. Reid, 141 Ky. 402, 133 S.W. 219 (1911); Day v. New York Central R. Co.,
51 N.Y. 583 (1873). Both of these cases are cited supra, note 117.
11017 Me. 296 (1840).
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out that the defendant's repudiation excused the plaintiff from making
a tender of the balance of the purchase price, the court said:
"But the plaintiff's claim must be limited to what is just and
equitable, under all the circumstances. He had made some payments; but he had enjoyed the farm for eighteen or twenty years.
The jury should have been permitted to take this into consideration, even without an account in offset, as it was necessarily connected with the plaintiff's claim, and was of a character to affect
and qualify it. This not having been done, we sustain the exception and grant a new trial."120
Thus, the court treated the plaintiff's failure to make restoration along
with the other factors which influence the determination of what
constitutes an unjust retention.
It will be observed that there is considerable opportunity for the
exercise of judicial discretion in the determination of the net legal
benefit which is unjustly retained. For the benefit retained by the
plaintiff may be regarded as too trivial in character to be considered,1 21
or it may be assumed to be equal to a certain type of benefit the plaintiff
conferred upon the defendant.122 Or, as is frequently the case, the use
120 Id. at 300. And in the case of Ham v. Goodrich, 37 N.H. 185 (1858) the plaintifl:
took possession of the defendant's farm and rendered services under an oral agreement whereby
the farm was to be conveyed to him. The plaintifl: requested an instruction to the effect that
the measure should be the value of the farm, but the court refused. At page 190 the court
said, ''What did he [the plaintiff] reasonably deserve to have, under all of the circumstances,
was the question. The actual services performed by himself and his family; the circumstances..
under which he went to reside there; the annoyance, if any, of the particular services rendered;
the board of the defendant's intestate; the income of the farm received by the plaintiff, and
the board of himself and his family; all of these matters, and others that might be suggested,
were to be considered by the jury in deciding what the plaintifl: was justly entitled to and
should receive." Since the determination of the net benefit is regarded as a part of the
plaintiff's case, and does not have to be raised by a counter-claim, i.t would seem that the
plaintiff should have the burden of proving the amount of the net benefit. This view has been
adopted by the CoNTRACTs REsTATEMENT §357(1), comment g (1932). Also see: Wo_ODWAIID, QUASI CoNTRACTS §106 (1913).
121 In Miller v. Roberts, 169 Mass. 134, 47 N.E. 585 (1897), cited supra, note 112, at
page 147, the court said, ''In the present case no question was raised in regard to an allowance
for these articles in making up the verdict. Seemingly, they were of trifling value, but if
there is dispute about them, the rights of the parties in this respect can be determined hereafter." Also cf. Masson v. Swan, 6 Heisk. (53 Tenn.) 450 (1871), cited supra, note 117,
wherein the plaintiff's claim for insurance premiums he had paid while in possession of the
defendant's land was held not recoverable. But cf. Zanone v. Tashgian, 231 Ky. 454, 21 S.W.
(2d) 825 (1929), cited infra, note 122, wherein recovery for insurance was allowed.
122 In Zanone v. Tashgian, 231 Ky. 454, 21 S.W. (2d) 825 (1929) the plaintiff took
possession of the defendant's land and made payments under an oral agreement, the terms of
which were in dispute. The plaintiff contended that he had purchased the land, and the
defendant contended that the payments were rents under an oral lease. In discussing the
agreement as one of purchase at page 459, the court sa~d, "The vendor will be fully protected
by returning to him the property, together with a rental thereon equal to legal interest on the
agreed consideration, and the vendee will be fully compensated by returning to him, with
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of land, improvements, or interest may be involved.123 In that event,
the net legal benefit unjustly retained may be varied considerably depending upon the method of calculating the legal benefit derived from
the improvements, and also upon the length of time for which the use
of land, or the interest was figured. Some of these problems are discussed
in another article.124

8. Determination of Unjust Retention-Willingness of Defendant
to be Bound by Oral Agreement

Although many of the cases discussed in the preceding sections
have denied restitution because of the inequitable conduct of the
plaintiff. in repudiating the oral agreement, and in failing to make
restoration of the benefit he received from the defendant, other decisions have reached the same result by emphasizing the absence of
unjustness on the part of the defendant.
If the oral agreement is interpreted as "void" under the particular
statute of frauds,1 25 or if the doctrine of Britton v. Turner1 26 is followed,
restitution is frequently allowed, and in these situations the defendant's .
willingness to perfopn is seldom mentioned.
On the other hand, if recovery is denied, there are numerous
• decisions which emphasize that the defendant must be put in default
before a suit in restitution can be brought.127 In the case of Sennett
legal interest, the payments made on the consideration. In determining what constitutes a fair
compensation for the use of property in such cases, this court has adopted the rule that the
rental recoverable shall not be greater or less than legal interest on the agreed consideration
for the land." Also see Grace v. Gholson, 159 Ky. 359 at 362, 167 S.W. 420 (1914).
123 In numerous cases the landowner has been allowed to set-off reliance use and occupation against the vendee's claim for improvement: Williams v. Williams, 210 Ala. 372, 98
S. 200 (1923); Collins v. Thayer, 74 ID. 138 (1874) (use and occupation was set off against
vendee's claim for money paid); M'Cracken v. Sanders, 4 Bibb (7 Ky.) 511 (1817); Fox's
Heirs v. Longly, 1 A. K. Marsh. (8 Ky.) 388 (1818); M'Campbell v. M'Campbell, 5 Litt.
(15 Ky.) 92 (1824); Grimes v. Shrieve, 6 T.B. Mon. (22 Ky.) 546 (1828); Coldwell v.
Davidson, 187 Ky. 490, 219 S.W. 445 (1920); Zanone v. Tashgian, 231 Ky. 454, 21 S.W.
(2d) 825 (1929); Richards v. Allen, 17 Me. 296 (1840); Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt, 1
Johns Ch. (N.Y.) 273 (1814); Albea v. Griffin, 22 N.C. 9 (1838); Union Central Life
Ins. Co. v. Cordon, 208 N.C. 723, 182 S.E. 496 (1935); Bender's Administrators v. Bender,
37 Pa. St. 419 (1860); Harris v. Harris, 70 Pa. St. 170 (1871); Holthouse v. Rynd, 155 Pa.
St. 43, 25 A. 760 (1893); Treece v. Treece, 73 Tenn. 221 (1880); Schneider v. Reed, 123
Wis. 488, 101 N.W. 682 (1905).
124 Jeanblanc, ''Restitution under the Statute of Frauds: Measurement of the Legal
Benefit Unjustly Retained," 15 Mo. L. Rllv. 1 (1950).
125 See discussion, supra, pp. 938-940, and pp. 947-949.
126 See supra, note 18.
127 In York v. Washburn, (D.C. Minn. 1902) 118 F. 316, for example, the plaintiff
orally agreed to purchase a mining lease from the defendant for $150,000. The owner of the
realty had agreed with the defendant that the lease would be executed from the owner directly
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v. Shehan,1 28 for example, the plaintiff was denied restitution for
fifty dollars paid under an oral agreement to purchase land because
he failed to make a tender of the balance of the purchase price. The
court said:
"The payments and the conveyance must be treated as concurrent and dependent acts, to be performed at the same time. The
rule in respect to contracts of that character is that neither party
can compel performance by the other, or rescind for non-performance, without first offering and being ready to-perform on his part.
This rule applies to all contracts with mutual and dependent
covenants or promi~es, including alike parol contracts, void as such
by the statute of frauds, and those not affected by the statute."129
It has also been indicated, in some instances, that the plaintiff
must make a demand upon the defendant for a return of the benefit
conferred before· bringing a suit for restitution.180 But, it should be
recalled, in the cases denying restitution, the emphasis may be placed
upon the unjustness of the plaintiff's conduct,1 31 or upon the absence
of unjustness on the part of the defendant.
As long as the defendant remains ready and willing to perform
the oral agreement according to its terms, it may be argued that his
retention of the benefit he received from the plaintiff's performance
is not unjust and, therefore, restitution should be denied. In some
instances, however, it is difficult to ascertain whether the conduct
of the defendant is inconsistent with his willingness to continue performance of the oral agreement. In this connection the defendant's
conduct in ordering the plaintiff to vacate,1 32 in retaking possession
to the plaintiff. After paying $10,000 to the defendant, the plaintiff repudiated the oral agreement, and sued to recover the money he had paid thereunder. The defendant and the owner
of the property remained willing and able to execute the lease as agreed. A judgment dismissing the plaintiff's complaint on its merits was affirmed in (C.C.A. 8th, 1904) 129 F. 564.
The following cases are to the same effect: Leach v. Rowley, 138 Cal. 709, 72 P. 403 (1903);
Sims v. Hutchins, 8 Smed. & M. (16 Miss.) 328 (1847); Lane v. Shackford, 5 N.H. 130
(1830); Hays Drilling Co. v. Sartain, 108 Okla. 181, 235 P. 615 (1925); Hathaway & Armstrong v. Hoge, l Sadler (Pa.) 119, 1 A. 392 (1885).
' 12s 27 Minn. 328, 7 N.W. 266 (1880).
129 Id. at 329. ·
130 See discussion of Richards v. Allen, 17

Me. 296 (1840), supra, pp. 951-952. Also see
Abbott v. Draper, 4 D~o (N.Y.) 51 at 53 (1847), discussed supra, note 111.
131 See supra, notes 24 and 111.
132 In Kenniston v. Blakie, 121 Mass. 552 (1877) the parties entered into an oral
agreement for the sale of land, and the plaintiff-vendee, upon paying $500, took possession of
the premises. The vendor then prepared the papers, but the vendee refused to execute the
purchase money mortgage claiming that it was not drawn as agreed. The vendor then ordered
the plaintiff to vacate the premises. The plaintiff complied and, without making a demand •
upon the vendor for the money paid, brought this action to recover the $500. The court found
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of the land he had ora,lly promised to sell to the plaintiff,1 33 or in
failing to perform some collateral promise,1 34 was considered, but in
each of these instances the defendant's conduct was found to be consistent with his willingness to continue performance of the unenforceable agreement and restitution was denied. Similarly, the defendant's
lack of authority to sell land,1 35 his failure to perfect the title,1 36 his
that the mortgage had been prepared in accordance with the oral agreement, that the plaintiff
was in default, and denied recovery. Since the vendor had shown his ability and willingness
to perform the unenforceable agreement, and the plaintiff had refused, his subsequent conduct in ordering the plaintiff from the premises was not regarded as unjust.
13S In Donaldson Admr. v. Waters Admr., 35 Ala. 107 (1859) the vendee orally agreed
to purchase certain land from the defendant-ven_dor, took possession thereof, and paid a portion
of the purchase price. The vendor then retook possession of the premises. In a suit to recover
the purchase money paid, the plaintiff contended that the defendant-vendor by retaking possession of the land had repudiated the oral agreement. The lower court's judgment for the
defendant was affirmed on appeal. At page 116 the court said, "Whether or not the act of
recovering the land and the mesne profits was a repudiation of the verbal contract of sale,
which the other party could elect to regard as a rescission, must necessarily have depended upon
the terms of the contract. The recovery of the land may have been consistent with the terms
of the contract, for the purpose of obtaining payment of the purchase-money yet due; or it
may have been for the purpose of preventing an adverse possession from ripening into a title,
which would deprive him of the ability to comply with his contract to convey." Thus, the
defendant's conduct in retaking possession was not necessarily to be regarded as unjust, and
inconsistent with his willingness to perform the oral agreement.
134 In Campbell v. Fair, (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) 82 S.W. (2d) 1038 the oral agreement
provided that the plaintiff was to purchase certain land upon which the defendant was to
plant pecan and peach trees aµd care for them for a period of seven years. The plaintiff
sought to recover the money paid under this agreement, contending that the defendant had
failed to cultivate the trees properly, and had executed an oil and gas lease which amounted
to a repudiation of the unenforceable agreement. The defendant contended that he had
complied with the terms of the agreement, and stood ready and willing to make a deed to the
plaintiff if the latter would comply with the agreement. A finding for the defendant was
affirmed on appaj. At page 1039 the court said: "The universal rule seems to be that a
vendee may not recover of a vendor money paid as a part of the consideration for land purchased under a contract which is within the statute of frauds, unless he shows a tender of
compliance on his part with the contract and a refusal of compliance on the part of the vendor."
135 In Clark v. Davidson, 53 Wis. 317, 10 N.W. 384 (1881) the defendant-administrator
obtained a license to sell certain land which belonged to the estate. He then entered into an
oral agreement to sell the"land to the plaintiff, and the latter took possession of it. A question
then arose as to the validity of the defendant's license to sell the land, and the parties further
agre~d orally that if the title could not be conveyed to the plaintiff, he was to be compensated
at a designated rate for his services and improvements made upon the premises. Without the
fault of either the plaintiff or the defendant the defendant failed to obtain the authority to
sell the land, and the plaintiff sued on the oral contract to recover for his services and improvements. The lower court allowed recovery, but this was reversed on appeal. At p. 321, the
upper court indicated, however, that the plaintiff should be allowed to recover "a fair and
reasonable compensation for his labor and improvements made under such circumstances,
over and above the value of the crops grown upon the farm."
136 In Summers v. Hively, 78 W.Va. 53, 88 S.E. 608 (1916) the vendor sued for specific performance of an agreement to purchase land which had not been signed by the vendee.
The vendee sought, in a cross bill, the return of the money he had paid under the unenforceable agreement as part of the purchase price, contending that the defendant had failed to
perfect his title. The court found that the agreement could not be specifically enforced because
of the statute of frauds, and also that the defendant-vendee could not recover the purchase
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suffering the property to be sold for taxes,1 37 or under foreclosure
proceedings138 may be insufficient to establish that he was in default.
And even though the defendant's conduct in mortgaging,1 39 or
selling1 40 the property to another after the plaintiff's repudiation of
th<;! oral agreement may show that the defendant is no longer willing
to perform, restitution may still be denied on the ground that the
defendant had already remained willing and able to perform for a
sufficient period of time. 141
money he had paid. The defendant's title was not defective and he was willing and able to
perform the unenforceable agreement. In this regard, the court said at pages 56-57, "Unless
the status of the title be doubtful, equity will decree specific performance of a valid contract
of sale, though the title was acquired by hostile adverse possession, under color, continued
during the prescribed statutory period.... Immaterial defects and technical objection will not
suffice, where the purchaser substantially may acquire what he contracted for.••• After the
expiration of the limitation period, a good and indefeasible title vests in an occupant under
color upon compliance with the requisite character and conditions of possession."
137 In Marsh v. Wyckoff, 10 Bosw. (23 N.Y. Super. Ct.) 202 (1863) the plaintiff was
denied recovery for money paid under an oral agreement for the purchase of land, even though
the defendant had allowed the land to be sold for taxes. It appeared, however, that the
defendant had two years in which to redeem the land, and if the plaintiff had fullilled his
part of the oral agreement, the defendant would have had the necessary funds. The court also
emphasized that the plaintiff failed to make a demand on the defendant for the return of the
purchase money paid, and had not put the defendant in default before the commencement of
this action.
138 See Hooper v. First Exchange National Bk. of Coeur D'Alene, (C.C.A. 9th, 1931)
53 F. (2d) 593 at 597.
139 In Lane v. Shackford, 5 N.H. 130 (1830) the plaintiff was denied recovery for money
paid under an oral agreement for the purchase of land. The court emphasized the fact that
the defendant.remained willing and able to perform his part of the oral agreement. At page
134 the court said: "He [the defendant] cannot be deemed to have disabled himself to convey
to the plaintiff by conveying the land in mortgage to another, so long as he has the right to
redeem."
140 In Wyvell v. Jones, 37 Minn. 68, 33 N.W. 43 (1887) the defendant orally agreed
to convey a tract of land to the plaintiff in return for which the latter was to deliver certain
furniture and pay the balance in cash. After the furniture had been delivered, and the plaintiff had taken possession of the land, the defendant demanded the balance of the purchase
price, but failed to tender a deed to the plaintiff. Upon the plaintiff's refusal to pay, the
defendant conveyed the land to another who apparently took possession of the premises. The
plaintiff sued for recovery of what he had parted with under the unenforceable agreement.
In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, the court said at page 69, "Under the contract of
the parties, the execution and delivery of the deed by the defendant, and the payment of the
balance of the purchase-money, were to be simultaneous and concurrent; and hence, if the
defendant desired to put the plaintiff in default, it was his duty to accompany his demand of
the unpaid balance of the purchase-money by a tender of a deed. The mere refusal of the
plaintiff to pay such balance, in the absence of such tender, was not enough."
141 Durham Consol. Land & Improv. Co. v. Guthrie, 116 N.C. 381, 21 S.E. 952 (1895)
(twelve months).
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9. Determination of Unjust Retention-Suggested Solution
The problem of determining what constitutes an unjust retention
in the statute of frauds cases involving restitution frequently forces the
courts against the horns of a dilemma. For if they permit the defaulting plaintiff to recover in restitution, they are said to "confer
upon the party guilty of the breach of contract ,a right against the party
not in default" ;142 and if they deny restitution, "the plaintiff is in
effect charged with and made to suffer for the breach of a contract
which he could not enforce."143 In other words, a rule which would
work well when a dishonest plaintiff seeks restitution from an honest
defendant, often would work poorly when an honest plaintiff seeks
restitution from a dishonest defendant, and- vice versa. In this connection, Professor Woodward suggested:
"Both evils, it is believed, may be avoided by permitting the
plaintiff in default to recover if it appears that before default he
requested the defendant to join him in signing such a written
memorandum as would comply with the requirements of the statute, and that the defendant refused or failed within a reasonable
time so to do."144
This suggestion has been approved by Professor Williston,145 and by
the Restatement of Contracts. 146 If it were followed, the parties would
be forced to reveal their own unjustness and, as the detective discovers
the guilty party by re-enacting the "crime scene," so the courts would
be afforded the accurate and necessary data by which to determine
whether or not the defendant's retention of the benefit was unjust.
If the defendant refused to join the plaintiff in creating a valid contract, then restitution should be allowed with no deduction for any
damages the defendant may have sustained by reason of the plaintiff's
repudiation of the oral agreement. If the defendant signed the written
IJ?.emorandum together with the plaintiff and thereby created a valid
QuASI CoNTRACTS 236 (1893).
143Kingv. Welcome, 5 Gray (71 Mass.) 41 at43 (1855).
144 WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS 156 (1913).
145 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., 1565 (1936).
146 CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT §357 (1932). Also see §217(1)(h) which provides,
"Where action is brought for the fair value of part performance rendered under such a contract, anJ:1 the statute is the plaintiff's only justification for his failure to complete performance,
· he cannot recover it before he abandoned performance the defendant neither refused to perform, nor where full performance from him was not then due, refused to sign a sufficient
memorandum, if his promise would otherwise be enforceable."
142 KEENER,
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contract, then he would be allowed damages if the plaintiff failed to
perform completely. Thus a suit for restitution, in the latter situation,
would be brought under an enforceable agreement, and Professor
Woodward's suggestion does not purport to. solve the much discussed
cont:roversy-1 47 of the defaulting plaintiff's right to restitution under a
valid contract. But, it should be noticed, the Restatement of Contracts
not only approved Professor Woodward's suggestion; it also adopted
a rule whereby one who innocently or. inadvertently repudiates a valid
contract may still recover in restitution.148 The New York Law Revision Commission also recommended, though the proposed statute
was not enacted, that the defaulting vendee ( under an enforceable
agreement) should be allowed to recover his payments in excess of
the vendor's damages, if any, and twenty per cent of the contract price
as a kind of penalty _for the plaintiff's repudiation.149 Further, there
are numerous statutes which regulate the right of the defaulting employee to recover for services rendered.150 The writer also believes
that the mere fact that the plaintiff is in default should not necessarily
bar him from a recovery in restitution. Rather, the plaintiff's repudiation, which is perhaps more unjust if the agreement is enforceable,
should be considered along with all the other factors, discussed in the
preceding sec~ons, which affect the determination of what constitutes
an unjust retention.
147 Ashley, "Britton v. Turner,'' 24 YALE L. J. 544 (1915); Ballantine, "Forfeiture for.
Breach of Contract," 5 MINN. L. R:sv. 329 (1921), reprinted in SELECTED REAI>mcs ON nm
LAw OF CONTRACTS 943 (1931); Corbin, "The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitu•
tion of Installments Paid," 40 YALE L. J. 1013 (1931); note, 22 ILI.. L. REv. 315 (1927);
Laube, "The Defaulting Employee-Britton v. Turner Reviewed," 83 UNIV. PA. L. R:sv. 825
at 833 (1935); Williston commented on this article in "The Defaulting Employee-a Correction,'' 84 Umv. PA. L. R:sv. 68 (1935), and Laube replied in "The Defaulting EmployeeNo Retraction," 84 Umv. PA. L. REv. 69 (1935); Laube, "The Right of an Employee Discharged for Cause," 20 MINN. L. R:sv. 597 (1936); Mulder, "The Defaulting Plaintiff in
North Carolina," 15 N.C.L. R:sv. 255 (1937); Patterson, "Restitution for Benefits Conferred
by Party in Default under Contract,'' prepared for the New York Law Revision Commission,
N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 65 (F) 17 (1942); note, 24 CoL. L. R:sv. 885 (1924); KEENER,
QUASI CONTRACTS 214-231 (1893); CoNTRACTS R:ssTAT.EMENT §357 (1932); 5 WILLISTON,
CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., §§1473-1477 (1937); WooDWAIU>, QuASI CoNT.RACTS §§162-178
(1913).
148 See supra, note 146.
149 Patterson, ''Restitution for Benefits Conferred by Party in Default under Contract,''
prepared for the New York Law Revision Commission, N.Y. Legis. Doc. 65 (F) 17 (1942).
150 Note, 43 HARV. L. R:sv. 647 (1930). Also see Patterson, ''Restitution for Benefits
Conferred by Party in Default under Contract,'' prepared_for the New York Law Revision
Commission, N .Y. Legis. Doc. No. 65 (F) 17, 33, 44-46 (1942); McGowan, "The Divisibility
of Employment Contracts,'' 21 lowA L. REv. 50 at 69-78 (1935); 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS,
rev. ed., §1477 (1937).
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I 0. Conclusions
The existence of a legal benefit alone does not justify a recovery
in restitution. It must also be shown that the retention of that benefit
is unjust. To determine in a particular case whether or not the legal
benefit is unjustly retained involves, for the most part, an examination
of the inequitable or unjust conduct of each party, for it must be shown
that "as between the two persons,"151 the retention of the legal benefit
is unjust.
·
In the cases of restitution under oral agreements which do not
comply with the statute of frauds, the defendant's request and promise
of return performance are generally admissible to show that the plaintiff was not an officious intermeddler, that he did not intend to render
his performance as a gift, and that the defendant probably expected
to render his own performance as compensation therefor. But there
is a conflict in the authorities as to the extent of unjustness to be attributed to the one who repudiates such an oral agreement. The
overwhelming majority of the courts have found that, except in a few
ins~ces, the defendant's repudiation of the unenforceable agreement,
together with his acceptance, retention or consumption of the plaintiff's
performance, constitutes an unjust retention. On the other hand, the
majority of the courts have found that the plaintiff's repudiation is
sufficiently inequitable so the defendant's acceptance, consumption
or retention of the benefit is not regarded as unjust. There are numerous decisions, however, especially in jurisdictions which follow the
doctrine of Britton 11. T1!,rner, or which interpret the oral agreement
as "void" under the particular statute of frauds, that attribute much
less unjustness to the repudiating party. In such cases, it will be
observed, the inequitable character of the plaintiff's conduct, as well
as that of the defendant's varies considerably depending upon such
factors as the following: (I) the effect of the repudiation of the oral
agreement, (2) the wilful or inadventent character of the plaintiff's
repudiation, (3) the effect of the statute of frauds upon the oral agreement, ( 4) the extent of performance rendered, (5) the failure to make
restoration, and (6) the willingness of the defendant to be bound by
the terms of the oral agreement. Although, as stated in the Restatement
of Restitution, "No definite rule can be stated which will determine
in all cases whether restitution will or will not be granted since the
151 fusnntnoN RESTATl!MENT
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courts consider all the circumstances involved in the particular case,"11s2
it is believed that the above list includes most of the factors which may
be of importance in the determination of what constitutes an unjust
retention in the cases involving restitution under the statute of frauds.
Even though the plaintiff is found to be entitled to restitution
of a legal benefit which is unjustly retained, the exact pecuniary
amount of that benefit must still be determined. That problem is discussed in another: article. 153
102 Id., §140, com.mentb.
153 Jeanblanc, "Restitution

under the Statute of Frauds: Measurement of the Legal
Benefit Unjustly Retained," 15 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1950).

